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A Good Regulation Went Bad; Fractional Elk Graze New Mexico

I. Introduction
In 1989, the New Mexico State Game Commission (SGC) and Department of Game and
Fish @GF) promulgated the first of a new generation of regulations governing private landowner
permits for elk.' These regulations proposed to provide compensation to landowners for elk
With modifications, that original regulation
which invade and destroy their private pr~perty.~
was re-promulgated in 1995 as 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5, Private Land Elk License All~cation.~
The
regulation requires landowners to demonstrate elk depredations, and once shown, allows the
landowner access to a permit distribution ~ y s t e m .Within
~
that allocation system, the landowner
receives permits based on a number of considerations, such as desired elk herd size, previous
years' hunting successes within theGame Management Unit and the size of the ranch.5 These
permits allow the bearer to claim elk licenses from the DGF for use during the subsequent
hunting s e a ~ o n . ~
New Mexico required the regulation because elk are capable of causing substantial
damage to private landowners' property and because of continuing interest in expanding the

' Establishing a System for Allocating Elk Licenses on Private Lan& and Public L a n b
Within Game Management Units, New Mexico Department of Game and Fish, State Game
Commission, Regulation No. 667, July 28, 1989.
Gonzales, Santiago, R., Access System for Private Land in New Mexico, TRANS.5
WILDL.&NAT.RES. CONF.179,179 (1989).

4 N .~A. ~

Compare 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5, Private Land ElkLicense Allocation, State Game
Commission, New Mexico Department of Game and Fish, April 1, 1995; Amendment No. I to
Regulation No. 667, Establishing a System for Allocating Elk Licenses on Private and Public
Lands Within Game Management Units, State Game Commission, New Mexico Department of
Game and Fish, Order No. 3-92, May 20, 1992; Regulation No. 667, Establishing a System for
Allocating Elk Licenses on Private and Public Lands Within Game Management Units, State
Game Commission, New Mexico Department of Game and Fish, July 28, 1989.

19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 $8 7 - 8.
19 N.M.A.C. 30.5

5 8.1.

population of elk in the state.7 Rather than "tooth and claw" depredations caused by large
carnivores, elk cause "displacement" depredations.' Because elk compete with other ruminants
for the same forage in the same habitat, elk can damage the economic viability of private lands?
The regulation intended to compensate landowners for this displacement and for physical
damage to property.I0 However, the compensation to landowners is indirect and imprecise
because the DGF does not match the compensation to the depredations, but rather only matches
the quantity of permits allocated to the depredations." Landowners must market the permits to
receive the intended compensation, which leaves the actual compensation variable and
inconsistent with the damage inflicted by elk.I2 The regulation fails its purposes because
landowners are not guaranteed compensation by the permitting process.

n

The regulation is an inefficient allocation of wildlife resources because it shifts
administrative costs to the landowner. This shift must be halted. This note will discuss
regulatory options and recommend statutory authorization for a comprehensive administrative
system. Section I1 will describe the process under the current regulatory system. Section III will
discuss the shortcomings of this regulatory procedure. These shortcomings include both internal

' See Gonzales, supra note 2, at 179-80.
See,e.g.WYO.STAT.5 23-1-901 O (1977) which provides that damages from depredations
include the following:
"livestock damaged or killed by a trophy game animal, the damaged land, growing
cultivated crops, stored crops, seed crops, improvements and extraordinary damage to
grass."

See also COLO.REV.STAT.ANN.5 33-3-201 which was amended in 1993 to include the
following finding:
"(a) Large-scale damage to the property of individual landowners by wildlife, particularly
elk, is an increasingly common occurrence throughout Colorado;
"(b) While instances of such damage may be isolated, each can cause significant and
potentially devastating consequences to the landowner involved..."

Id.
'O

Santiago, supra note 2, at 179.

'I

See 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 5 8.5.1; 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 3 8.5.3.

See generaNy Santiago, supra note 2;N.M.S.A.
17-1-14 (Michie 1978).
l2

5

17-3-14.1 (Michie 1978); N.M.S.A. §

-

r-.

and external difficulties; Section 111discusses both types. Finally, Section IV will outline the
recommended changes to the regulatory and statutory structure.

11. Background
The following section first discusses the regulatory history of 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5, and the
recent changes made to it in the 1995 promulgation. Next it outlines the statutory bases for the
regulation. Finally, it discusses the current regulatory procedure for acquiring, transferring, and
using landowner elk permits and licenses.
The initial attempts at providing landowner compensation for elk depredations followed
the DGF creation of a rudimentary license for private landowners." The DGF modernized the
regulation in 1989 by promulgating Regulation No. 667.14 The SGC amended it in 1992 to
extend the limited appeals process up through the DGF to the SGC.I5 In 1995, the SGC made
that regulation permanent and in a revised form in 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5.16 This revision codified
the fuller appeals process described in Amendment 1 of Regulation 667, State Game
Commission Order 3-92 as well as other structural and terminological changes. This codification
included changes in the definitions used in estimation of elk population^'^ and policies and
procedures for issuing ranch-only permits.ls
The first major change to the regulation expanded the variety of types of permits granted
by allowing ranch-only permits for hunting and management. Permits can be made ranch-only

Santiago R. Gonzales, Access Systems for Private Lands in New Mexico, TRANS.
54TH
N.A. WILDL.& NAT.RES. CONF.(1989) 179.
l3

l4

Regulation No. 667.

l5

Amendment 1 of Regulation 667, State Game Commission Order 3-92, 1992.

19 N.M.A.C. 30.5, State Game Commission, Department of Game and Fish of New
Mexico, 1995.
l6

l7

See 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 7.20.

l 8 19N.M.A.C. 30.5 §§ 8.6- 8.9. Forthepurposesof 19N.M.A.C. 30.5, ranch-only permits
allow a claimed license to be used on the ranch it was allocated to and no further. Other permits
allow greater degrees of access to the license holder, because licenses can be used on ranches up
to and including all participating private property throughout the Game Management Unit. See
generally 1995-1996 Agreement Concerning Harvesting of Elk on Landowner Properly, State
Game Commission, New Mexico Department of Game and Fish, 1995 ("Landowner
Agreement").

,o by request or by defaultI9if the landowner opts not to sign the Landowner Agreement.2o The
permits are specifically made ranch-only when the ranch size is greater than 10,000 acres, with or
without landowner signature of the Agreement2' This arrangement allows for ranch-by-ranch
management within Game Management Units (GMUS)?~and seems designed to encourage big
game hunting ranches.23 When a landowner signs the access waiver in the landowner agreement,
general permits are allocated which authorizes invasive hunting kom any hunter bearing a permit
for the general GMU.24 For landowners, the compensation for depredation by elk is not derived
from the access granted to hunters, but rather from the sale of permits to acquire licenses to kill
animals.25
Ranch-only permits serve a slightly different purpose for the landowner than the general
permits because the permits limit access to private land and allow the purchase of the license to
hunt.26 With ranch-only permits, landowners can limit the damage caused by hunters by
~ natural costs that
selecting the hunters allowed.onto their private property more c a r e f ~ l l y .The

l9

P

Landowner Agreement, supra note 18, at 1.

20 The Landowner Agreement establishes some conditions and explanations for users of
permits. The Landowner Agreement is only sent to landowners with depredations who applied
for permits and had adequate acreage and depredations to qualify for a permit under the formulae
contained in 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5.

2'

See 19N.M.A.C. 30.5 $ 8.6-8.9.

22

19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 Q 8.6.

19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 $ 8.7. Note that this same provision limiting the largest ranches to
ranch-only status applies the same constriction to entire GMUs. See Table 1.
23

24

See Landowner Agreement, supra note 18.

See note 11 supra; Gonzales, supra note 2, at 180 ("Public access is granted to license
holders without charge through a contract signed between the Department and landowner in
exchange for an authorization.")
25

26

,n

See note 8, supra.

27 The DGF grants these permits for the express purpose of limiting resident populations
within the largest ranches to a specific levels. During the 1995 allocation, there were only 49
ranches which qualified for the mandatory ranch-only status by size and 103 which qualified by
location. See 1995 Elk Landowner List, New Mexico Department of Game and Fish, 1995;
Table 1; 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 Q 8.7. The focus of most of 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 is on the management
of elk within GMU boundaries. The allocation of ranch-only permits for use within "external

ranchers face are forage consumption and damage to fencingz8 Allowing access to private lands
could cause higher costs for the landowners while reducing the natural damages caused by the
elkz9. These permits serve the additional purpose embodied in 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 $ 8.2,
incorporating Section 7.2, which defines herd objective." The Area Chief of a given GMU can
issue ranch-only permits supplementary to the formula-based allotment the landowner received".
Though the discretion allowed is li~nited,"~
the Area Chief could award, by accident or design,
permits adequate to completely eradicate resident elk under the regulatory allowances made by
"herd objective" or "estimated population trends.""

?

Though the permit awarding system includes much discretion, the increased appeals

ranch boundaries" does little more than increase the intensity of elk management by defining
GMU sub-boundaries. For the small landowners who receive only a few permits to sell, the cost
of having numerous hunters from all across the Game Management Unit invade their ranch could
be substantial.
28

Gonzales, supra note 2, at 181

29 At some level, it is a simple tradeoff. As the number of successful hunters with valid
permits on a unit of private property rises, the local elk population falls. However, hunters might
accidentally panic elk, damage fences or forage while chasing and retrieving the elk or its
carcass. Further, because elk will share forage with other species, there is a risk of damage to
any cattle the landowner might own. These additional costs are not costs that the landowner
would bear in the absence of hunting and are therefore attributable to the hunting. See generally,
Boyd, Raymond J., American Elk, in Big Game of North America, 11 (Schmidt, John L. &
Gilbert, Douglas L. eds. 1978).

That provision states that "'herd objective' shall mean the desire to increase, decrease or
maintain an existing estimated elk population at levels relative to previous-year estimates."
30

5 8.2.

'I

19 N.M.A.C. 30.5

"

19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 $ 8.2.

The regulation defines herd objective as "the desire to increase, decrease or maintain an
existing estimated elk population at levels relative to previous-year estimates." 19 N.M.A.C.
30.5 $7.2. The regulation defines population trend as "the elk population trends (increase,
stable, decrease) relative to previously estimated e k populations." 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 $ 7.6. It
does not demand that ranch-only discretionary allocations be consistent with general state
policies or that the Area Chief contim a trend over time. With or without a conscious design,
elk on a particular plot of land could be completely eradicated. Compare 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 5
8.8.1 with 19 N.M.A.C. 31.8 $ 8.1.4 (limiting depredation hunt permits to an additional 5% of
total GMU allocation per year).
"

?

P

process contained in 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 does not. The appeals process does significantly expand
the public accountability of the DGF.34 A landowner can challenge any formula-based allotment
of permits.35 The appeals process proceeds upward through the levels of administrative
ultimately reaching the SGC?' where the challenger can present witne~ses?~
Prior to
that SGC hearing, all other appeals are conducted without witnesses and require investigation by
the administrative officer.I9 The final stage clearly raises the level of administrative
accountability because it happens during regular and public SGC meetings.40 Though the public
cannot testify without some clear connection to the parties at the hearing:' the process does
guarantee review by the agency of its internal procedures if the landowner pursues a complaint.
Further, the process ultimately presents the private criticism in a public forum.
These procedures described above are part of the authority to create, grant, and control
the use of landowner permits vested in the New Mexico Department of Game and Fish and
derived from a series statutory provisions guiding the DGF. Wildlife wiihin the state are
managed by the state for the public under a public trust doctrine.4z Pursuant to that authority, the
legislature delegated the management responsibility to an administrative agency through a series
of statutes. The most general statutory authority, N.M.S.A. $ 17-1-1, provides policy guidance

A

l4

See generally 19 N.M.A.C. 31.8.

l6

See 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 $ 9 .

j8

19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 $ 9.6.

l9

See generally, 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 $ 9.

4'

19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 $ 9.6 provides that "If the State Game commission agrees to hear the
appeal, a hearing shall be scheduled during a regular meeting. At that time a reasonable number
of witnesses may be presented along with supporting documentation." The emphasis of the
appeals process is on personal involvement. 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 $ 9.2.2 states that "If the
landowner disagrees with the calculation, he may appeal the officers' findings by first filing a
written appeal, with supporting documentation, to the appropriate Area Office Supervisor." The
regulation does not prevent interested third parties from speaking, but such parties must be
presented by either the DGF or the landowner. .
n

42

State ex rel. Sofecio v. H e m , 67 P.2d 219,223 (N.M. 1936).

for the DGF by describing the legislative intent in granting power to the DGF.43 N.M.S.A. 9 171-14 (A)(13) allows the SGC to promulgate licensing procedures for hunting of any protected
species. Further, N.M.S.A. 5 17-1-14.1 allows the SGC to issue landowner permits and the
appropriate regulations. N.M.S.A. 9 17-3-31 provides similar authority for the DGF to issue
pennits for damage to crops." These two authorizations can best be seen as providing the state
the tools to compensate landowners for displacement and destructive losses caused by elk.
Under the current regulatory system, there are limited numbers of public licenses to kill
elk:5 Landowners may apply for and acquire these licenses independent of depredations on
private lands. Those landowners experiencing depredations may apply for and receive additional
special landowner permits to be used only on private deeded land. Applying for the permit is
free, but use of the permit to claim a license requires payment of the statutory license fees." The
DGF allocates permits by use of mathematical formulae and by use of administrative discretion."
Once acquired, pursuant to signing the DGF's Landowner Agreement, the permits may be
transferred among private parties without oversight by the DGF.48 Licenses are more difficult to
transfer. Once claimed, thk licenses are bound by~ ~ ; D G F 'seasonal
S
con~trictions~~
and by any

43

That provision states that
"[ilt is the purpose of this act and the policy of the state of New Mexico to provide
an adequate and flexible system for the protection of the game and fish of New
Mexico and for their use and development for public recreation and food supply,
-- and to provide for their propagation, planting, protection, regulation, and
conservation to the extent necessary to provide and maintain an adequate supply
of game and fish within the state of ~ e Mexico."
&

N.M.S.A.

5 17-1-1 (Michie 1978).

That statutory provision states that "[tlhe state game and fish warden [director of the
department of game and fish] may grant permits to owners or lessees of land and for the capture
or destruction on their lands of any protected game doing damage to their cultivated crops or
property." N.M.S.A. 5 17-3-31.
45

See 19 N.M.A.C. 31.8.

" Landowner Agreement,supra note 18.
47

19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 5 7-8.

48

Gonzales, supra note 2, at 180-181.

49

19 N.M.A.C. 31.8.

-

landowner options which might render the license ranch-only." The landowner may appeal a
limited number of administrative decisions:' but not discretionary permit allocations or findings
of no depredations. It is the use of the formula to determine base permit amounts, granting of
discretionary permits to expand the allocation, and the very limited appeal of those results which
are the most problematic for landowners and environmentalists together.

See Landowner Agreement, supra note 18; 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5.

19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 5 9.

In. Discussion
This section discusses the problems with the current version of 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5.
Subsection A outlines the structural flaws in the regulation as well as the flaws created by the
application of the regulation. It focusses on the tendency toward inaccuracy created by a lack of
administrative duty to confirm depredations, problems created by the use of delayed responses to
the measurement of depredations, errors in the regulatory treatment of marginal ranches with elk
depredations, logical flaws in assuming that all ranches can economically advertise private
landowner permits, and finally, the difficulties created by the appeals process. Subsection B
outlines the regulation's failings when compared to other common and statutory law provisions.
It focusses on a need for conjunctive analysis, considers the regulatory interference with the
defense of private property, A d inspects the regulation's weakening of private land trespass
protection. Subsection C outlines the proposals for change of the c a n t regulatory system. It
discusses protecting the landowner from sudden shifts of elk between private land and modifying
the appeals process to better serve the landowner.

A. Regulatory Problems: Lag, Fractionalism, and Disproportionality
Independent of difficulties with the ~pplicationof 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5,the regulation
creates problems because of its structure. It enforces a tendency toward inaccuracy because
neither private landowners nor the DGF have a duty to inspect and report elk depredation levels.
Further, the regulation provides disincentives to accurate reporting, leaving the DGF unable to
safeguard the location and population of the elk. Also, the regulation's formulae produce a
fractional elk problem which unfairly burdens small landowner^.^^ The only method of offsetting
depredation losses, by selling the permits, fails to measure the cost to the landowner and to
compensate for the loss commensurately. Finally, the appeals process, which does not allow
challenge of departmental discretion, leaves the landowner without a method to guarantee a
remedy for the problem: the elk on the land.

The fractional elk problem is a consequence of uneven division of the landowner elk
permits within a GMU across the qualifying ranches of the GMU. Assuming constant returns
from each pennit sold, each ranch which merits permits will not get precisely the correct quantity
of permits adequate to compensate the landowner for the depredations suffered because the total
permits available are limited by biological demands not compensatory demands. See 19
N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 8.2.
52

T,

1. Momentum Toward Inaccuracy

The regulation places no affirmative duties to report or verify elk populations on the
landowner or the DGF.53Assuming most landowners derive some benefit from marginal
presence of elk, landowners will report depredations when the cost of depredations and fence
damage outweighs the benefit from their "wildlife values." The applicants for elk permits
represent those landowners who want permits to hunt, to market, or to reduce the elk local
p o p ~ l a t i o n .The
~ ~ further the level of depredations outweighs the landowner's "wildlife value,"
the greater the incentive to report. This incentive is heightened if the landowner observes sudden
upward shifts in the resident elk population.
These shifts occur because elk are hunted throughout the full GMUs." Because most
permits are not issued for ranch-only use,S6individual parcels within GMUs can eradicate local
elk populations while other properties see little or no reduction. Because population
management is a factor of the state-wides7and local elk population targets:' the regulation does

In a regulation governing short-term technical assistance provided to landowners suffering
from depredations and animal damage, the DGF must verify each landowner claim. It
specifically provides that the aid will be provided only "[alfter verification of the complaint."
Regulation No. 673, Depredation Assistance to Landowners, State Game Commission, New
Mexico Department of Game and Fish, August 18, 1989. In 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5, the DGF is only
required to "evaluate requests for private land authorizations in accordance with the above
procedures." 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 5 9.1. Ironically, the more stringent verification standard is
applied in the regulation which each landowner can use only once. See Regulation No. 673 5
1.2.1.a.
"

\-,

In this, I assume only that landowners have some private value for the wildlife resident on
their land. Elk may be desired for a number of reasons, many of which are unlikely to bring the
landowner financial compensation. See Brown, Peny J . & Manfredo, Michael J., Social Values
Dejned, in Valuing Wildlife (Decker, Daniel J. & Goff, Gary R. eds. 1987) 12, at 14-6. The
economic losses from elk and the unpriced wildlife values counterbalance each other. The
problem that this presents is two-fold: first that landowners may not have incentive to report
depredations by elk immediately which disguises the total economic loss caused by elk; second
that the state purpose for compensatory licenses may be ill-served by a regulation which does not
account for this limitation on landowner incentives.
54

ss 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5

5 8.1.

56

Compare 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 $5 8.6 -8.8; 1995 Elk Landowner List.

s7

AS a function of combined GMU goals; see N.M.S.A.

''

19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 5 8.4.
11

5

17-1-1.

not account for individual shifts between ranches. The overall elk population in the GMU might
meet desired targets,59but individual ranches would be much less depredated. When the GMU's
target population is allocated, the allocation will be determined inaccurately for individual
ranches, and the allocation of permits will remain inaccurate unless annual individual ranch
inspections are made by the DGF.

q,

Landowners have an incentive to report depredations accurately only when their level of
depredation rises relative to previous measurements and the landowner could acquire additional
permits. Every inspection of displacement depredations will be inaccurate to a degree. After an
initial inspection, the only reason a landowner would reinspect for depredations is the
opportunity to obtain more permits.60 When more landowners participate within a GMU, the
value of individual landowner depredations falls?' Thus, there is incentive to resist increased
participation and to inflate the individual level of depredations. This inflationary pressure is
especially strong in smaller ranches which most risk being marginalized. consequently, the
depredations permits' requests are not accurate representations of the elk population at large, or
of the burden experienced by landowners.
In addition to ineffectively controlling the landowner incentive to report depredations, the
regulation puts no affirmative duty on the DGF to inspect depredations ~laims.6~
During an
appeal, it does require that the claim be verified and inve~tigated;~but the subject of appeal is
The
limited to the formula allotment, which limits the reach of the verification req~irement.~~
verification might reasonably include inspecting for depredati~ns;~but such action is not
specifically required. This narrow construction of the duty to inspect might be explained by the

See 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 8.2. This procedure does not consider burdens on individual
ranches except within the context of total burdens within the GMU. See 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 33
8.4 - 8.5 (governing only the fraction of total permits granted to a ranch)
59

60 More accurately, a landowner would apply for permits only when the newly-acquired
permits produce increased wealth for the landowner. Permits that go unmarketed produce little
income; permits marketed for a much-reduced price might reduce net income.

This is a function of the load of elk on private land required to produce a percentage
adequate to merit an elk permit. As the total acreage burdened by elk rises, if the landowner's
burden does not rise with it, over time, the landowner will receive fewer permits.
"

'' See supra note 1.
63

Compare 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 9.3 with 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 8 9.2.1.

64

19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 9 9.2.

65

19 N.M.A.C. 30.5

5 9.2.1.

T
,

,n

statutory limitations of the DGF's ability to set prices for hunting license. By statute, the DGF
must limit its administrative fees to administrative costs, and cannot change the prices of
li~enses.6~
Individual verification of depredations would entail inspections of over 2100
properties in 20 G M U S . ~It~is unlikely that the limited administration fees can cover the high
costs of regular inspection, given a limited staff for the inspections, and the limitations on the
departmental budget:'
Failure to require inspections is not the only variable affecting the annual determination
of elk population and permit goals. The regulation outlines the factors to be included in setting
elk population ~ g e t s . 6One
~ factor included is "herd obje~tive."'~
.Assuming there is a static
target population for the state and within GMUs, the herd objective cannot be determined
without information about the c m n t population. The regulation provides for "estimated
populationsn7'and "estimated population trends,"72but ignores the inevitable problem: these
terms do not prescribe a procedure for estimation or verification in subsequent years.73 It does
not require the DGF to do additional calculations apart from subtracting hunter successes from
the original estimates.74 The regulation does not require full consideration of every relevant fact
when makings its required comparison, but instead relies on card surveys which are inherently

P

" N.M.S.A. 5 17-1-14 (A) (13):

The application process for a permit to kill elk is free. To
actually claim the license, however, the fees are $50 for New Mexico residents and $400 for nonresidents. N.M.S.A. 17-3-13 (Michie 1978) governs the prices set for hunting licenses.
67

1995 Elk Landowner List.

19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 5 8.2 defines: "the criteria ... shall be herd objectives, estimated elk
populations, estimated elk occupied habitat, relative elk densities, past harvest data, and
estimated population trend."
69

O'
19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 3 8.2. The regulation defines herd objective as "the desire to increase,
decrease, or maintain an existing estimated elk population at levels relative to previous-year
estimates."

"

Ibid
Ibid
19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 5 8.

inaccurate because there is no requirement that the surveys be returned to the DGF.7s Where the
DGF could require full reporting by all hunters, it does n0t.7~Where the DGF could collect and
consider data about locations of hunting success within GMU's, it does not. Collecting complete
data could provide valuable assistance in setting GMU-population goals as well as locations
where discretionary permits would be desirable, but the current regulation defeats this purpose.

?

This method of deducing current populations from hunter successes magnifies any initial
errors in the population census. Whether the original
error is underestimation or overestimation
of elk population, the consequence is marginalization of small landowners. In the first case,
marginalization
occurs because a restricted number of licensesn results in a higher elk burden
being required per acre to qualify for a permit. In the second case the smalles&ches are denied
compensation because the return per permit is lowered, making it economically inefficient for
them to participate in the program. Current targets for permits are directly tied to hunting
su~cess.7~
When there are too few elk for the permits, hunters will be unsuccessful, resulting in
more permits in the future,79and when there are too many elk, the hunting success in a given year
will decrease the permits available in the future. In either case, small landowners cannot meet
the demands of the system and the system stops providing small landowners compensation for
the burden on their land.
*

2. Sudden Population Shifts and Annual Responses
The regulatory structure also fails because it does not directly bar manmade involuntary
shifts of elk between private properties. In New Mexico, there are no substantive limitations on
the ability of landowners to harass game. While it is illegal to take the game out of season:!'
regulations do not bar harassment by use of animals, vehicles, or other non-damaging

19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 5 7.18 provides that "'Card Survey' shall mean the elk hunter harvest
survey provided by the Department for the purpose of determining elk harvest. Only those
returned to the Department for analysis will be used." The regulation does not require that these
surveys be returned to the DGF, and consequently, the information gleaned from analyzing the
card surveys will not measure the elk populations as well as they might.
75

76

19 N.M.A.C. 30.5

5 7.17.

N.M.S.A. 5 17-1-14 (D).

I?

P
,

techniq~es.~'
When landowners waive their right to exclude trespassers in exchange for the
permitsJ2 the landowner agreement makes no mention of baning harassment of game.83 Even if
the regulation or statutes prohibited harassment more broadly, there are problems of proof. The
most difficult distinction is between incidental and deliberate harassment of game. Sudden shifts
of population will not be prevented by barring harassment of game, but by requiring consistent
monitoring of elk populations. When such a change is seen by the DGF, the permits allocated
within the GMUs should be reevaluated to ensure accurate compensation.
Where there are sudden undesirable and reported invasions by elk, local officers can act
to prevent undue burdens on the landowner. The permit process grants District Chiefs the power
to award discretionary permitsg4or to hold special depredation huntss5 These responses to elk
population changes are counterproductive, however. The first method is ineffective because
these discretionary permits do not rely on clear management principless6for implementation.

r'

Note that there are limitations on hunter methodology. Pursuant to N.M.S.A. 3 17-1-14
(D) (Michie 1978), the state game commission controls "[tlhe hunting, pursuing, capturing,
killing, or wounding of any game animal, birds or fish in or upon any game refuge, rest ground,
or closed water or closed area or during any closed season established or proclaimed by the state
game commission." See also N.M.S.A. 5 17-2-1 (Michie 1978). The DGF implements this
authority in 19 N.M.A.C. 3 1.l, Hunting and Fishing - Manner ofTaking, State Game
Commission, New Mexico Department of Game and Fish, April 1, 1995. This regulation is
specifically limited to methods of hunting. The only significant exception to that conclusion is
N.M.A.C. 31.1 3 17.3 which provides that "[ilt shall be unlawful, at any time, to pursue, harass,
harry, drive, or rally any protected species by use of or from a motor-driven vehicle, powerboat,
sailboat, or aircraft." This prohibition, though made greater by the phrase "at any time," remains
weaker than it might be because landowners remain free to harass game on foot, from horseback,
or any permutation involving dismounting, hiking, or cycling in.
82

Landowner Agreement, supra note 7, at 1

See generally Landowner Agreement, supra note 7. In particular, the Landowner
Agreement does not work to prevent the landowner from acquiring GMU-wide permits, selling
them, and then harassing all the resident elk into leaving the landowner's property. In such a
case, the landowner can reap the financial benefits of the arrangement and suffer few of the
serious consequences of depredations and hunting. The regulation exacerbates this problem if
the DGF does not make annual verification inspections.

r'-

86 The regulation specifically provides: "The Director may authorize population reduction
hunts for ... elk ...when justified in writing by department personnel." 19 N.M.A.C. 3 1.8 5 8.1.

There is no clear regulatory definition of when permits can be issued, and no evidence that they
will be issued in accordance with broader plans for elk population or for landowner elk
burden^.^' The population goals for elk herds represents public policy decision. Allowing
discretionary permits without substantial guidance and supervision by either the public or
officials accountable to the public directly undermines the policy which determined the
population goals: it is no longer policy for New Mexicans generally, but a policy for the District
Chiefs. The unlimited delegation of discretion leads to derogation of the statewide policy and a
clear preference for local interests. The wildlife of the state is to be managed for the state, and
the broader the local discretion, the less meaningful statewide management plans will be.
Just as discretion undermines the regulatory purposes, so do special depredation hunts.
These special hunts are counterproductive to the goal of managing the elk herd population for the
residents of the state and in ensuring compensation to landowners. The b ~ d e on
n private
landowners of allowing public hunters onto privately-owned land is substantial. During the
landowner-permit process, the landowner retains some control over the process of getting
compensation. The only goal of out-of-season depredation hunts is population reducti0n,8~and
the landowner does not acquire title to the permits and cannot sell them for compen~ation.~~
Thus, these permits offer the landowner only the benefit of reducing the elk population^" but not
compensation for resident elk and no second try at a compensatory hunt. Consequently, these
hunts only provide localized benefits to selected ranchers. There is no showing that nonparticipating ranches have access to either depredation hunts or to discretionary permits?'
Therefore, the only method for reducing the elk burden forces landowners to suffer invasive
hunting on their private land; those that do not wish to suffer the invasion are left without a legal
remedy.

"

See 19N.M.A.C. 31.8 $5 8.1- 8.2.

19 N.M.A.C. 3 1.8 5 8.2.5 provides: "Anagreement will be signed by the landowner
disallowing the ability to charge a fee for the authorizations or associated trespass rights."
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9' The permits and proof must be applied for before consideration is made. The discretionary
permits are "allocated to affected ranches" in cases where necessary "to achieve the desired
harvest ... on a case-bycase basis." 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 5 8.5; 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 5 8.8.1.
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3. Marginal Ranches and Fractional Elk
Because trophy hunters most value bull elk permits, the key to determining a ranch's
compensation for elk depredations is the number of bull permits?* The highest bidders pay for
horns on the wall. The most frequent complaint by landowners is their inability to use cow elk
permits for profit?' Ranches must advertise to sell the permits? and the cost of advertising,
added to the cost of bearing the elk, must be less than the price paid for the permit if it is to be
profitable. When a ranch receives only one permit, it does not benefit from economies of scale in
ad~ertisement.~~
When the smallest ranch receives a single permit for a cow license, its expected
return is much less, which exacerbates the problem. Thus, a larger ranch can use its bull elk
permits and their higher return to offset the lower return from cow permits, while a smaller ranch
cannot do so. The costs of carrying male and female elk on private land are essentially the
same," it is only the sale price of permits which distinguishes the value of the permits.
Consequently, the smaller marginal ranch receives less compensation from the permit process,
even with the same per-acre burden of elk. This difference in levels of compensation is
See Decker, Daniel J , et al., Theoretical Developments in Assessing Social Values of
Wildlife: Toward a Comprehensive Understanding of Wildlife Recreation Involvement, in
VALUING
WILDLIFE
(Decker, Daniel J. & Goff, Gary R. eds.) (1987) 90-1. Those authors suggest
that hunters progress through stages of participation that can be characterized based on
satisfaction of their needs. Even when a hunter moves to the highest level of participation, in
which the hunter "finds satisfaction in the total hunting experience." The key is that "[tlhere is a
breadth of satisfactions available to him." Id. Consequently, even if the hunter progresses past
the trophy stage, the hunter will still derive satisfaction from the trophy qualities of the target.
92
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Interview, A1 Schneberger, Nov. 7, 1995.

Advertisement here is used broadly to mean any communication initiated by private
parties. At a minimum, it requires conversation which has opportunity costs, and at the most, it
is purchased communication.
q4

95 Economies of scale in advertisement would produce a lower cost of advertising per permit
sold. The notion is that a single advertisement might be adequate to sell one or a hundred
permits, but the act of advertisement is a fixed cost which can be amortized amongst the total
number of permits sold. The scope of this paper does not include substantial discussion of
fragmentation of the permit market, diversification of the permit market, or the inherent flaws in
advertising a single price in classified advertisement. These elements are decidedly secondary to
the simpler notion that the cost of advertising can be spread amongst all permits sold.

P

% The cost of carrying a cow might be slightly higher if the cow is bearing a calf. Both the
calf after birth, and the cow's increased consumption prior to calving, might raise the forage
losses over those caused by bull elk. The distinction is likely to be slight, and certainly not key
to the analysis of the burdens on the landowners.
.

aggravated when the landowner suffers substantial invasion of his land by hunters in the process
of using the single permit allotted to their ranch.97

?

In addition to the problems discussed above, the permit process creates fractional elk.
These artificial elk are the fractional uncompensated land left when the regulatory formula
divides the predetermined quantity of permits throughout the GMUs total occupied acres. The
fractions in allocating permits occur for two reasons. First, because individual landowners do not
have the undivided year-round attention of resident elk?8 Elk migrate to summer and winter
forages throughout the year, and consequently, landowners cannot measure depredations by
simply counting.elk.99 Second, the fractions appear
because ranch sizes are inconsistent with the
-.
occupied acreage requirement per landowner permit (a number which varies from GMU to GMU
and from year to year).'" These fractional elk appear in every ranch calculation, but as the ranch
97 A landowner bears the full cost of hunter "misses" where hunters come onto the land and
fail to take a licensed animal. A landowner wishing to drop the resident elk population as low as
possible might sign the waiver and endure a great many "pass-through" hunters and their failures.
See Agreement, supra note 7, at 1. At a minimum, a hunting failure results in higher future costs
created by a larger resident elk population. The problem is exacerbated because there is no
guarantee that this specific landowner will be compensated by additional permits in the future.

See Boyd, Raymond J., American Elk in Big Game of North America (Schmidt, John L, &
Gilbert, Douglas L. eds.) 11, at 18-19. See also COLO.REV. STAT.5 33-3-20 1 which contains the
finding that:
"(a) [rluminating animals such as cows, deer, antelope, and elk tend to eat for short
periods of time during the day and then move to resting places at other times, making it appear as
though they are not continuously present; and
98

.-,

"(b) Notwithstanding such appearances, it is appropriate to recognize that when such
animals graze on private or leased private land intermittently during any given day, the amount
they consume may be comparable to the amount they would consume if they remained present
and visible on such land for the entire day."

-

99

See Boyd, supra note 45, at 18-19.

loo When considering the effect on a single GMU, the formula in 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 $5 8.3 8.5 can be reduced to an occupied acreage requirement per permit allocated. This number will
vary across GMUs for a variety of reasons. The number of participating ranches, the acreage of
participating ranches, the percentage of hunting successes within the GMU, and the DGF's elk
population estimates and targets will all influence this number. Once the formula adjusts the
acreage of each participating ranch for its level of occupation and goals, this number can then be
divided by the total landowner permits available. For example, assuming that every ranch in a
GMU is sized as a multiple of 50 acres, using two diametric sizes like 50 acres and 5000 acres,
and assuming, that the GMU formula determines that for each 30 acres a landowner permit will
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size increases, the impact of the fractional elk decreases prop~rtionally.'~'
When the formula is
used to calculate permits, remainders in the division of total occupied weighted acres, and the
total permits available, occur.lo2The regulation does not give explicit preference to every
applicant with bona fide verifiable depredations,lo3thus the regulation does not assure that every
such applicant will get at least one permit.'" Consequently, some landowners with depredations
will be denied permits because of their ranch size.Io5 Fractional elk represent much smaller
burdens for larger ranches, because they will receive permits to sell and thereby offset the
marginal uncompensated elk burden. When the smaller ranches receive no permits, they have no
legal remedy for their elk burden and fall outside the ambit of the regulatory system.
4. Fixed Costs: Limited Benefits From Transfers

The sole method the regulation provides for compensating landowners for the burden of
their depredations is the use or transfer of permits.Io6 Once awarded, the-permit becomes private
property, fully transferable between buyer and seller.107Individual permits might be limited to
ranch-only use, but the transfer of the permit is not barred. The profitability of the transfer is
dependent on the individual landowner acting to advertise and negotiate the price for the permit,
and thereby whatever compensation for the elk depredations, and the DGF does not intervene in
that process.
The transfer process imposes costs on the parties, even if they negotiate conditions which

be awarded, the two ranches will suffer significantly different burdens. The smallest ranch will
be uncompensated for 40% of the total burden suffered, while the larger ranch suffers only .04%
uncompensation.
lo'

See Table 1.

Io2

See 19N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 8.4.1; 19N.M.A.C. 30.5 5 8.5.

lo'

Compare 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 5 8.5; 19N.M.A.C. 30.5 5 8.8.

'" 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5
affected ranches."
lo'

5 8.8 provides: "additional landowner permits may be allocated to

See Table 1.

See Access for Private Lands in New Mexico, Santiago Gonzales, Trans. 54th N.A. Wildl.
62 Nat. Res. Conf (1 989) 179 at 180.
Io6

are most favorable to both. These costs include applying for the permits,lo8inspection by the
landlord and verification by the DGF,'09marketing the permit, and negotiating with a pool of
potential buyers for the best price. Moreover, there will be technical costs because the returnmaximizing landowner might need to waive the right to exclude other permit-bearing hunters.Il0
Though the landowner is not required to sign the waiver clause in the application," a ranch-only
permit would be less valuable to a hunter than a game management unit-wide permit. A
landowner intending to market permits broadly and thereby to compete with other landowners
across the state, would prefer to make the waiver and sell the more valuable permits, even with
the higher internal costs.ii2
Landowners suffer other costs as part of the regulatory compensation process. Aside
from privately-caused damage to fencing, which is punished by New Mexico law,"3 the private
parties bear the full costs of the hunting.l14 In a competitive market for p e w t sales, the most
cost-eff~cientsellers will be those who can minimize the transaction costs for each permit sold.
The marketing and verification/inspectioncosts are fixed costs, and consequently are reduced per
permit as the quantity of permits sold rises. These fixed costs are what provide the marginal
profit between equal landowners. There will be other factors such as hunting amenities or

log

Id.

'09 Landowner Agreement, supra note 18, at 2 instructs: "landowner ... will provide
reasonable access to include keys and/or combinations if necessary, to locked gates for
Department personnel."

'I0

Landowner Agreement, supra note 18, waiver clause, at 1.

'I

Landowner Agreement, supra note 18, at 1.

"'There is also a prisoner's dilemma problem here.

Each landowner can maximize the return
gained by each permit if each other landowner also makes the waiver. Assuming that elk density
across a GMU is consistent, this would not be problematic. If that density varies, it behooves a
landowner with high elk density to refuse the waiver and to hoard the resident elk for the permits
he can market. There is another reason to refuse the waiver in variable-density GMUs: a
landowner making the waiver and possessing high density populations is likely to have more
hunters on the land. That 'invasion cost' caused by other permits which the landowner did not
profit from would be a disincentive to continue to waive the exclusionary right.

9 40-47-12 (1953);

'I3

N.M.S.A.

Brown v.

'I4

Gonzales, supra note 2, at 181.

361 P.2d 152 at 156.

,-.

vehicle access which affect the price chargeable per permit.'l5 Consequently, the larger ranches
can better minimize the per unit fmed costs, and will push smaller ranches, which cannot meet
those reduced costs out of the permit-selling market.
Though its purposes are described as applying to all landowners, the regulation does not
assure all landowners that their individual costs will be recovered by the sale of permits.'I6
Under the guise of granting all landowners the freedom to negotiate permit prices, the real effect
of the regulation is to encourage the propagation of wildlife by a select few ranches which are the
most profitable. The most lucrative ranching operatidns will not be those which merely market
permits, but those which receive numerous permits and cany more bull elk."' Large ranch
owners can facilitate the growth of the resident elk herds.llS By removing cattle and growing the
correct forage, the landowner can enhance the resident elk population, qualify for more
landowner permits, and dominate the market. A large ranch owner might even have an incentive
to under-report his burden to keep the total permits sold down, raising tlie value of permits within
the GMU by limiting the supply of permits available. The result is that the compensation for
depredations on private land accrues to a limited few that can offer a specialized service.
Because they cannot compete for higher levels of compensation small landowners have little
incentive to participate aside from their own enjoyment. After personal consumptive demand for
elk is fulfilled, elk are more likely to be chased off than destroyed in accordance with the
regulatory goals.

P

"5 If these beneficial conditions are incidental (such as easy vehicle access), then the goods
are essentially the same. If they are created in response to hunter demand (such as lodging,
guides, or blinds), the good provided has changed substantially.

Gonzales, supra note 2, at 180. Further, the regulation defines part of its scope as
"[llandowners who experience elk utilization within their deeded lands." 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 3 2.
Additionally, the criteria for establishing the desired elk populations do not include ensuring
even the most rudimentary management of the landowner permit market (which might ensure
that depredated landowners are guaranteed a recovery). See 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 5 8.2.
'I6

See Table 2.

,P.

' I x See Lueck, Dean, Property Rights and the Economic Logic of Wildlife Institutions, 35
NAT.RESOURCES
J. 625, at 643. Lueck states "as the size of landholdings increases, the resulting
decrease in the costs of contracting among landowners will increase the gains from transacting an
agreement among the landowners and the more likely it is that the rights to the wildlife stock will
be established." For a large landholder in New Mexico, the prophecy is self-fulfilling. Because
the DGF already grants limited property rights to elk to landowners, applying Lueck's model
indicates that the decreasing contract costs will favor the larger landowners. Applying this note's
model (suggesting that there are substantial fixed costs), the implication is clear: the largest
landowners and only the largest landowners have a direct and substantial interest in maintaining
elk populations.

5. Administrative Failures: Appeals and Individual Arrangements
The regulation allows appeals of formula-based all~tments."~
Landowners are not
required to accept the offered permits,120but are limited to them if they do accept the
al10tment.I~~The appeals process is strictly limited to the formula-based permit allotments.122
The landowner cannot challenge the award of discretionary permits.123Further, the landowner
cannot challenge the gender-balance of the permit allotment, because the gender allotment is not
generated as a function of the f0rmu1a.I~~
The regulation does not provide guidance for the
allotment of discretionary permits, aside from some general description^,'^^ and discretionary
allotments are not reviewable by DGF administration or the public.126The gender burden of the
allotment does not appear subject to administrative review, and no provisions for gender
preferences for small ranches appear in the regulation.12' An appeal of the gender distribution
allocated to landowners in their permits would at least ensure a minimum return to small
landowners. Ideally, preference should be given to granting bull-elk permits to small
landowners.
Though the regulation allows appeals of formula allotments to the allotment given to the
appealing
a number of other decisions should be appealable by landowners. For
example, when a landowner is denied permits, and discretionary permits are awarded within the
same GMU to other landowners, challenge to the inspection of lands and the relative elk burdens
would be appropriate. Further, a landowner who was denied permits should be allowed to
question the inspections of other local ranches and their allotments, since inaccuracy in the
measurement of other ranches could bias the required burden upwards, leading to unjustified
19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 5 9.2.
Iz0

Landowner Agreement, supra note 18, at 1; Gonzales, supra note 2, at 181

12'

See 19N.M.A.C. 30.5 5 9.0; ~ ~ N . M . A . c30.5
. 5 8.8.1.

'22

19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 5 9.2.

'24

See 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 3 8.4 - 8.5.

'26

19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 5 9.

Y
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denial.129By limiting the appeals process to formula-based allotments, the regulation encourages
discretionary permits and prevents substantial public review. Because wildlife is managed for
the benefit of the public, it follows that there should be some public accounting for discretionary
decisions made by the DGF.
The regulation serves to govern two elements within the process of achieving state policy.
First, it works to achieve the general state policy outlined in N.M.S.A. 3 17-1-1,130
and second,
the specific state policy outlined by the determinations of population targets made by 19
N.M.A.C. 30.513' and 19 N.M.A.C. 3 1.8.132Its balancing of previous hunting successes and
ultimate targets work to produce a state policy goal ofharvests and revenue.13) The closer total
landowner participation comes to full participation, the more elk populations will reach the
desired equilibrium. The fewer the claims in a GMU, the more individually important a
landowner will be.134Specifically 3 8.5.2 and .3 provide that a specific ranch's allotment is
related to its proportion of the overall total ranch acres depredated by elk135.The larger the to
private land occupied by elk (depreciated by density of depredation), the larger the minimum
required occupied acreage for a permit to be allotted136.Consequently, with minimal
participation, a small ranch will receive permits above the equilibrium, limiting its burden to a

,P.

This is especially problematic where the GMU is a heterogenous blend of large ranches
and smaller ones. Where there is homogeneity, the risk of this other ranch bias falls. See Table
1.
IZ9

130

19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 $ 3.

I '

See 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 $3; 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 $9 8.1-8.5.

See 19 N.M.A.C. 31.8 $ 13. Note that within this regulation, the discretion of the local
District Chief to countermand the general social policy is limited. See 19 N.M.A.C. 31.8 5 13.1.
Furthermore, the Area Chiefs discretion to permit private land population reduction hunts
("depredation hunts") on private land is based on administrative input from the District Chief as
well a s input from the landowner. The actual numbers allocated through the formulae in 19
N.M.A.C. 30.5 $5 8.3-8.5 are determined through the State Game Commission, and spelled out
in 19N.M.A.C. 31.8 $4 13.6-13.7.

See 19 N.M.A.C. $ 8.2.
I"

19 N.M.A.C. 30.5

8.5.

136

19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 $ 8.5.3.

position lower than state policy prescribes. As participation rises, its burden will rise,"7 and its
ability to offset the burden by compensation will fall. As noted above, small ranches suffer the
greatest impact by the presence of even a few elk, when compared to larger ranches. The
regulation thus puts increasing burdens on them to advertise, and to do so successfully. This
could eventually drive the small-ranch participant from the market for bearing elk on private
lands.

n

While this regulation implies a burden on landowners in planning desired elk populations
for GMUS,"~it discourages consideration of those burdens. The authority given to the DGF is
plenary.'" Its goals andmethods of achievihg those goals should be subieci to public review.
Further, the regulation does not provide for public planning and input140as it determines those
methods and goals. This planning and input is not merely an abstract public desire for more
wildlife expressed in terns of additional elk, it is a gauge of the changes ig the local ownership
and usage of land and a measure of the economic viability of certain types of land uses. If there
were adequate demand, it could be cost-effective for ranches to specialize in outfitting and
hunting rather than cattle ranching. The current regulation does not consider these and similar
economic shifts and the role of the ranches in these changes when it plans for elk pop~lations.'~'
In addition to the economic shifts that marketing elk can produce on ranches, other
individual management decisions can have effects on elk populations. Individual landowners
fencing out elk can have substantial effects on nearby residents, and even on the elk populations
at large. Elk are significantly mobile - capable of migrating 250 miles between summer and
winter seasons - and cross a number of terrains in New Mexico.'42 They maintain seasonal

"'19 N.M.A.C.

30.5 3 8.5.

Compare 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 3 2, whiih provides that it serves "all hunters who wish to
recreate on deeded lands in New Mexico," with 19 N.M.A.C. 31.8 which provides that agents of
the DGF "may authorize population reduction hunts for ... elk ... when justified in writing." The
first demonstrates an understanding of regular and continuous elk incursion on private lands,
while the second responds to an incidental incursions by elk.
13'

N.M.S.A.

5 17-1-1

19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 3 8.1 provides only that: "The Director, upon approval of the State
Game Commission, at the annual big game regulation Commission meeting, shall establish the
number of elk licenses within game management units through use of the elk allocation system
herein described." It does not provide for explicit inclusion of public preferences.
'40

14'

Boyd, supra note 45,at 19.
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forage areas and shift between them.I4' Consequently, erecting elk-proof fencing could shift the
migratory pattems of a specific herd or could make migration impossible. Without consideration
of landowner interests and without accounting for fencing plans of landowners, interruptions in
seasonal elk shifts and in population dynamics are possible. The incentive to use elk-proof
fencing exists, and must be considered when the SGC determine long term elk population
targets.
Furthermore, the elk's migratory pattems might be better managed in a regionally
coordinated manner. It might be desirable to market regions as elk havens where hunters can
hunt on private land without fear of damaging cattle or trespassing. By coordinating landowner
desires for elk population levels, interest in elk-proof fencing, and the economic interest in
commercial hunting of the elk, the returns to the state and the individual ranchers could be raised.
Also, by coordinating those interests, direct compensation to landowners by interested parties
could be facilitated. As it stands, the state does not consider the direct consequences of
arrangements where private parties pay landowners to free their land from cattle or to use the
land for free-roaming elk.'44 These types of "dedicated land for compensation" deals14*would

,-

I M Ranches are considered only in terms of their total deeded acreage. 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 5
8.5. While the elk-proof fencing would affect the degree of depredations, this is only a factor if
the DGF conducts regular inspections. Without a duty to report the reduced depredations, a
landowner can undermine the purpose of 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 5 8.5 by taking more permits than
would be merited had the elk-proof fenced land been discounted from the total deeded acreage.
The regulation does not explicitly consider the changes in practical environment caused by
individual management decisions of this sort.

Additionally, the regulation does not account for arrangements where compensation is paid
to landowners to remove cattle from private land. In such a case, the regulation would assume
100% occupation and award landowner permits accordingly. This exchange causes two possible
results. First, the landowner can receive the economic windfall and sell the permits in addition to
the prior agreement's compensation. If the purpose is to compensate landowners for elk
displacement of cattle, the regulatory purposes are undermined. Second, if the landowner does
not apply for permits and does not reap whatever windfall exists, the DGF will not accurately
measure elk populations by its deductive methods. Consequently, the DGF must at least make
some accounting for the change in use caused by these arrangements when it estimates
population and allocates permits.
Typically, the landowner agrees to dedicate a quantity of land for a specific use for
monetary compensation. As Gonzales noted, other writers found that landowners felt that
"wildlife had not paid its way" by matching the rates of return available from other uses.
Gonzales, supra note 2, at 180. One way of allowing higher returns to wildlife uses is protecting
14'

,(--

accurately measure the public interest in wildlife and elk specifically. It would seem appropriate
for any elk on private land policy to consider this form of compensation, and to adjust for the
effects on elk population and landowner permits.
In conclusion, there are five key failures of the regulation which undermine the purposes
of the regulation. The regulation fails to manage the internal and external incentives operating
on landowners as a group and individually. The smallest landowners have no special protection
from the burdens bf elk, and the regulation marginalized these ranches by inflicting the greatest
burdens on them. Ultimately, the regulation fails its purposes because it allows excessive
discretion and does not account for specialized land-use decisions.
B. Regulatory Inconsistencies: Common Law and Statutory Failings
While the regulation fails for all the reasons discussed above, the regulation also suffers
from conflicts with the common law and statutory provisions of New Mexico law. First,
regulation conflicts with statutory provisions because the DGF does not allow for cost-benefit
consideration of the elk population, and fails to consider the long term shifts of the population.
Second, the regulation prevents the landowner from protecting the land directly. Thus, the
landowner loses control over the regulatory process on private land, which conflicts with the
purposes of other statutory doctrines of land management. Finally, the regulation contradicts
common law trespass protection because the regulation presumes the presence of elk on private
land.
1. A Cost-Benefit Conjunctive Analysis is Needed

In a recent article, Dean Lueck posits a model in which landowner rights to wildlife
should be extended under certain circumstance^.'^^ Though wildlife-related land uses can most
easily described as various combinations of wildlife and a single other use, the model conceives
of multiple fonns of use of the same plot of land. His model demonstrates that at times, because
of contract costs, returns from wildlife uses will outweigh returns from more traditional uses, and
that this leads to acquisition of private rights in ~ i I d 1 i f e . lThe
~ ~ model assumes that the
landowner retainscontrol over the choice between competing uses for privately owned land.I4' If
these forms of compensation. Even assuming the DGF accounts for dedicated land in allocating
permits to prevent a windfall to anyone, if the DGF accounts for the elk by reducing the elk
population elsewhere, the public interest in changing the elk population is rnissemed.
See Lueck, Dean, Property Rights and the Economic Logic of Wildlife Institutions, 35 N.
RESOURCESJ. 625.
'41

'47

id. at 643-645.
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accurately measure the public interest in wildlife and elk specifically. It would seem appropriate
for any elk on private land policy to consider this form of compensation, and to adjust for the
effects on elk population and landowner permits.
In conclusion, there are five key failures of the regulation which undermine the purposes
of the regulation. The regulation fails to manage the internal and external incentives operating
on landowners as a group and individually. The smallest landowners have no special protection
from the burdens bf elk, and the regulation marginalized these ranches by inflicting the greatest
burdens on them. Ultimately, the regulation fails its purposes because it allows excessive
discretion and does not account for specialized land-use decisions.
B. Regulatory Inconsistencies: Common Law and Statutory Failings
While the regulation fails for all the reasons discussed above, the regulation also suffers
from conflicts with the common law and statutory provisions of New Mexico law. First,
regulation conflicts with statutory provisions because the DGF does not allow for cost-benefit
consideration of the elk population, and fails to consider the long term shifts of the population.
Second, the regulation prevents the landowner from protecting the land directly. Thus, the
landowner loses control over the regulatory process on private land, which conflicts with the
purposes of other statutory doctrines of land management. Finally, the regulation contradicts
common law trespass protection because the regulation presumes the presence of elk on private
land.
1. A Cost-Benefit Conjunctive Analysis is Needed

In a recent article, Dean Lueck posits a model in which landowner rights to wildlife
should be extended under certain circumstance^.'^^ Though wildlife-related land uses can most
easily described as various combinations of wildlife and a single other use, the model conceives
of multiple fonns of use of the same plot of land. His model demonstrates that at times, because
of contract costs, returns from wildlife uses will outweigh returns from more traditional uses, and
that this leads to acquisition of private rights in ~ i I d 1 i f e . lThe
~ ~ model assumes that the
landowner retainscontrol over the choice between competing uses for privately owned land.I4' If
these forms of compensation. Even assuming the DGF accounts for dedicated land in allocating
permits to prevent a windfall to anyone, if the DGF accounts for the elk by reducing the elk
population elsewhere, the public interest in changing the elk population is rnissemed.
See Lueck, Dean, Property Rights and the Economic Logic of Wildlife Institutions, 35 N.
RESOURCESJ. 625.
'41
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the control in question relies on rights to use the whole plot of private land to produce goods as
the landowner chooses, then any time wildlife that the landowner does not have rights to invade
that land, this diminishes the private rights. In applying Lueck's model to 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5, the
question is whether the wildlife on private land is merely accidental overflow of wildlife from
state land, or whether it is somehow distinct from public land wildlife, and therefore, whether the
landowner should have some right to the wildlife on private land.
Under New Mexico statutory provisions, there is no distinction between overflow and
privately-resident ~ i 1 d l i f e . lElk
~ ~ are one of the many wildlife products managed by the DGF.Is0
Assuming the legitimacy of its elk provisions, 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 and 19 N.M.A.C. 3 1.8 must
also meet the test implied in N.M.S.A. 5 17-1-1. That statute defines the policy of New Mexico
underlying the State Game Commission wildlife regulations. Thus, the population goals and
corresponding permit allocations must meet a test of adequacy.'5' State regulation of and private
production of wildlife jointly produce wildlife where private lands voluritarily serve to expand
production of state-sponsored goods, by contributing some fraction of their rights in land to the
production of those state-sponsored goods.'52 Assuming that New Mexico can coopt private land
in this manner without significant input from landowners, the question is not whether more elk
can be supported, but whether it is economically efficient to do so.153Because a number of wild
ruminants compete for generally the same forage,Is4production of one species would require
consideration of the burdens of the other species on the same lands.

I-

Neither is this economic balancing a problem for only one type of landowner, or only a
problem of balancing the interests of the DGF and a single landowner. Even though elk eat

5 17-1-1; N.M.S.A. 5
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Seegenerally N.M.S.A.

Is0

Gonzales, supra note 2, at 180.

Is'

N.M.S.A.

17-1-14.

5 17-1-1.

Is2 See supra note 79; Gonzales, supra note 2, at 180-181. By deeming private property as
probable habitat for elk, the DGF uses that private property for the public purpose of raising elk.
See Lueck, supra note 146, at 655-61. The voluntarism of the relationship between the private
landowner and the DGF is questionable. Even though there are certain regulatory elements
which are entirely voluntary, landowners cannot opt to have no resident elk. See generally,
Landowner Agreement, supra note 18; 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5.
Is3 Compare N.M.S.A. 5 17-1-1; 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5. Note that neither statute nor regulation
defines an upper bound to the size of population. It seems likely that the only real upper bound
would be the public willingness to allow the unrestricted expansion of elk on private land and the
degree of administrative accountability to legislators and their invaded constituents.
Is4

Boyd, supra note 45, at 20-1.

grass-type forage for the majority of the year,"' if the herd loses substantial portions of their
customary land because of elk-proof fencing, the herd can subsist on forested land.156Thus, for
at least a few seasons, direct and damaging consequences can occur to a wide variety of rural
landowners. The policy choices underlying the propagation of elk must be considered within the
benefits that can be derived from propagating other species, including cattle. Unilateral planning
for one species without explicit consideration of the attendant burdens produces inefficient
results.
One of these results is that the only limiting factors on an individual species is the other
species. On private lands, where cattle compete with elk, and a landowner is unable to
substantially limit the elk without harassing them, the cattle become the adjusting factor. Given
feed requirements for cattle and given limited forage product from the range, the elk drive cattle
from the land. When cattle are displaced by elk or deer, the landowner receives limited
compensation for the lost income. The effects on the cattle, whether from reduced carrying
capacity leading to reductions in cattle herd size or from reduced feed for the cattle requiring
increased dietary supplementation, directly affect the landowner. In certain cases, the
displacement may bring a net improvement to the productivity of the land. In most cases,
however, the landowner permit process is inadequate to compensate for losses incurred by every
landowner. Without balancing the economic benefits with the costs shifted to landowners when
propagating elk, the current policy does more harm than good.

2. Protecting Property: Regulatory Interference
Ranching is a risky business. Storms, drought, disease, predators, and elk can
substantially affect a rancher's operation. The risk has always rested with the rancher: he has
always borne the consequences for acts of nature. Though insurance may cover some forms of
injury, New Mexico law supports the affirmative protection of property from other forms of
injury."' For example, New Mexico issues crop-and-property licenses for destruction of animals

IS5

Id.

See Stewart v. O b e , 258 P.2d 369 at 370 (1953) ("where the running of livestock is
lawful, it is the duty of the owner of property to enclose it should he desire to keep roaming stock
off his premises." See generally Woofier v. Lincob, 309 P.2d 622 (1957);Allemande, 157 P.2d 493 (1945). See also N.M.S.A. 30-8-13 ("Every owner or custodian of
livestock shall exercise diligence to keep his livestock off the state public fenced highways.");
N.M.S.A. $47-17-3 (1953).
Is7

-

n

as innocent as jackrabbits.lS8 These licenses serve the purpose of protecting private property.'59
The landowner must file a complaint and the carcass remains state property.I6" Allocation and
use of elk permits is implicitly conditioned on compliance with the public trust doctrine which
~ ~ trust relationship implies non-malignancy of
defines the state administration of ~ i 1 d l i f e . lThis
use.

The current regulation does not contain a non-malignancy test.163There is no explicit
statement of non-detrimental use, but other state statutes and regulations which allow landowners
to defend their property (within certain guidelines) independent of state wildlife management
goals and plans imply it strongly.lM Thus, there is an inherent inconsistency when the state
possesses property defense statutes and then deliberately plans for the wildlife to damage private
property. The special forced-participation system created by 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 interferes with

''' See N.M. A.G. Op. 1379 (1936), at 120.
N.M.S.A.
/-

8 17-3-31.

See State ex rel. Sofecio v.
67 P.2d 219,223 (requiring lawful licensure for
private possession). See also N.M.S.A. 5 17-2-21 (requiring state officials to attempt to sell the
carcass of animals taken illegally). See generally N.M. A.G. Op. 88-43.
16"

16'

State ex rel. Sofecio v. Heffeman, 67 P.2d 219,233; N.M. A.G. Op. 88-43 at 1.

Non-malignancy here is used broadly to mean that the managed wildlife should not be
used to the detriment of citizens.
163

'"

,+-.

Compare 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5; 19N.M.A.C. 31.8,

The DGF controls depredation damage to proviQe land. It provides short term protection
to landowners suffering injury caused by protected species without reference to type of animal
causing the injury or type of injury caused. Regulation No. 673, Depredation Assistance to
Landowners. The New Mexico Legislature provided that compensatory landowner permits be
issued for elk and antelope damaging private land. N.M.S.A. 8 s 17-3-14 -14.1 (Michie 1978).
Further, the basis for those statutes is in N.M.S.A. 3 17-3-31 (Michie 1978), which provides that
the DGF "may grant permits to owners or lessees of land and for the capture and destruction on
their lands of any protected game doing damage to their cultivated crops or property." Where a
species is unprotected, the landowner's rights are significantly greater. In N.M.S.A. 77-1-2
(Michie 1978), the Legislature provided "that it shall be the right of any owner of livestock so
killed or injured by the actions of any dog to kill the dog while it is upon property controlled by
the owner of the livestock."

the liability assumed by landowners for incidental contact with wildlife.'65 Instead of assuming
that elk depredations will be an incidental effect of close contact with elk habitat,166the elk will
be resident on private lands by plan of the DGF.I6'

e

3. A New Statute Must Strengthen Trespass Protection
New Mexico statutory and common law assert private liability for contacts by either
individuals, their real or personal property with other individuals, their real or personal
property.I6' Landowners can be held accountable for the damage caused by their herds where
causation can be proven,'69except in specific circumstances where state interests subsume private
uses and require private action to serve a public purpose.'70 When, as in the case of elk
regulations, the state preempts wholly private liability for wholly private activities, the action has
This interference is in part because the landowner is not the agent of protection, and in part
because the protection given is not full prevention of invasion. See 19 N.M.A.C. 3 1 $ 8.2; 19
N.M.A.C. 30.5 5 8.5; Gonzales, supra note 2, at 179-80.
The physical proximity to otherwise undisturbed elk habitat is likely to produce
coincidental contact with elk. The distinguishing factor between that accidental contact and the
contact currently experienced is that the DGF plans for its elk population to be partly resident on
private lands rather than merely making regulatory allowance for the occasional unintentional
shift. See 19N.M.A.C. 31.8 $5 13.6 - 13.7.
16'

See supra,note 96.

16' TWOexamples of this assertion are statutes which govern wild dogs and common law
nuisance doctrines which govern overhanging tree limbs. N.M.S.A. $ 77-1-2 provides that "[ilf
any dog shall kill or injure any livestock, the owner or keeper of such dog shall be liable for all
damages that may be sustained thereby." In the case of &binen v. Fox, 703 P.2d 177 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1985), after reviewing the range of doctrines used in other states, the New Mexico Court of
Appeals concluded that "[tlhe privilege of a landowner to make use of his property as he sees fit
is generally qualified by the requirement that he exercise due regard for the interests of those
who may be affected by the landowner's activities on the property." It further held, given a
finding of nuisance, that "[tlhe trial court may grant both damages for already incurred injuries
and injunctive relief to prevent future harm where there is a showing of irreparable injury for
which there is no adequate and complete remedy at law." b b i n e t t v. FOX,703 P.2d 177, 181-82.

nett v. Fox, 703 P.2d 177 at 181.
17' See 618 P.2d 894: "the Legislature intended to protect the general public from injury by
imposing liability on governmental agencies when they fail to maintain safe public highways."
Compare Grubb v. Wolfe, 408 P.2d 756, decided in 1965, with N.M.S.A. $ 30-8-13(B) (Michie
1978), enacted in 1966. See also 6 Nat. Res J. 306.
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two clear effects on private landowners. First, the state action may expand the legal liabilities for
landowners without concomitantly expanding their protection. An example of this is that
landowners must do more to protect their pasture land from elk depredations when the state
increases the volume of those depredations. Second, the landowner may suffer reduced ability to
seek legal redress for injuries. An example of this is that a landowner who harasses elk and
forces them onto another landowner's property is not liable for the injuries thereby caused.I7'
As an example of the first effect, consider the statutory provision governing fencing along
state highways. Because the condemnation of land for highways directly affected a rancher's
pasture fencing, where New Mexico takes private land for the construction of highways, the state
accepts the liability for maintenance of the new fences.17' Further, the state provides the material
the statute
for constructing the fences.I7' Though the statute benefits one group ~ubstantially,'~~
implies a duty owed to all citizens.'75 The state concluded that its social goals of economic
development and modernization, by adding and improving roads, meritea acceptance of liability
for their maintenance. Propagation of elk is a similar goal, and similarly, the decision to
propagate elk puts a substantial and new burden on a specific portion of the human population.
The regulation notwithstanding, fencing out the elk at substantial cost is the only legal method
landowners have to prevent elk depredation^.'^^

,-.-

As an exam~leof the second effect on landowners. consider the inconsistencv of the
current regulation with trespass protection normally afforded the landowner. When lawful
fence exists, private parties are liable for trespass when their personal property (such as cattle)
Here, the fences were required because of the danger to the motoring public. See
v. Tucker, 618 P.2d 894, 898. Notice that N.M.S.A. 5 30-8-13
(B)(2) requires that the Highway Department "post proper signs along all highways under its
jurisdiction which are not fenced on both sides and which are adjacent to property containing
livestock." See also Mitchell v. Ridgwav, 421 P.2d 778,780.
"I

"'N.M.S.A.

8 30-8-13(B)(l).

'74 See Firemen's Fund Insurance Co. v. Tucker, 618 P.2d 894, 897; Mitchell v. Ridewav, 421
P.2d 778,778.

This duty is limited to preventing livestock from entering highways, not to general
of New
negligence in constructing inadequate fencing. Lerma v. State Hiehwav Dep-t
kkziw, 877 P.2d 1085 ("to protect the motoring public from wandering livestock"); cJ Calkins
v. Cox Estates, 792 P.2d 36,41 (limiting a landowner's duty owed to the purpose of the fence).
'75

-

This is true when based on individual action. See N.M.S.A. 17-1-14 (D).The landowner
could participate in a depredation hunt, but there is no guarantee of full exclusion of elk.

invades the land of others.'" Because elk are presumed to be resident and because the definition
of lawful fence does not require that the fence be elk-proof, there are two ways in which the
current regulations undermine trespass protections: first, when landowners attempt to assert
liability against other landowners whose cattle have trespassed; and second, when landowners
attempt tiassert liability against the state f i r the trespass of elk on private property. Proof of the
trespass claim generally requires that the defendant have intent and knowledge for the invasion to
occur,'78but occasionally those two factors are implied by the circumstance^.'^^ Consequently,
the difficult issue,iswhether acts by elk serve as a defense to the claim of trespass.lX0Whether or
not the elk trampling fences serves as a defense against the claim of failure to maintain a lawful
fence (and thereby allowing trespasses to occur), the consequences of elk muddle the issue of
personal accountability. Clearly the elk add to the liability of one landowner and hinder the
ability of neighboring landowners to protect themselves from trespass by cattle.
Further hindering redress, the landowner will be unable to assert liability against the state
even though the DGF manages the elk with an understanding that they will migrate to private
lands.'81 There are a number of reasons for supporting the extension of liability. The DGF

See Woofter v. Lincoln. 309 P.2d 622; Kingsolvine v. Reed, 393 P.2d 20; N.M.S.A.
47-17-1 -2.
In

$5

'79 Id.at 494, where the court noted that "it did not necessarily follow that they 'intended' that
they should graze on appellee's land." This statement implies a factual distinction; with
sufficiently persuasive facts, the intent might be implied from those facts.

Note that the problem is made more severe by the weak restrictions on harassment of
game. Generally, this note assumes that neighboring landowners make similar uses of
neighboring land. However valid the assumption is, a review of New Mexico law on the subject
of trespass by cattle suggests several considerations. First, that many claims against ranching
egos v. A l m , 157 P.2d 493
landowners are brought by dissimilar use landowners. See
(plaintiff under grazed his land while the defendant overgrazed his); Stewart v. Oberholtzer, 258
P.2d 369 (plaintiff owned a decorated residential lot while defendant raised horses); Woofter v.
M,309 P.2d 622 (plaintiff raised alfalfa while defendant ran sheep); but see Kingsolvin~v.
&&, 393 P.2d 20 (plaintiff sued for rental value of forage taken from an unfenced lot by
defendant's surrounding cattle). Second, that lawful fencing is the dispositive factual issue in
many of these cases because without lawful fencing, the requirements of proof are too difficult to
overcome. Third, that even if a lawful fence existed, it is entirely unclear that damage to that
fence by elk is considered anythmg other than an accident of nature. This suggests that the
increased burden falls on the private landowner who suffers the trespass. It is this type of
increased burden that this note criticizes.
la'

Gonzales, supra note 2, at 180-81.

n
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intends to use those private lands as a part of its management plan. Further, the state makes no
effort to restrict the movement of its elk herd, and additionally, the state even limits develovment
on land leased from the state.Ia2 Because the proof of willful conduct requires that it be specific
to the claimant's property, a claim against the DGF may be unsupported by the specific facts of
the case. However, maintaining elk herds too large to s u ~ v on
e public lands alone and
knowledge that they migrate seasonally might serve to imply that the management was deliberate
enough to incur state liability. In a common law suit, the implied proof might suffice against a
private party. In New Mexico, it would fail because the state retains a limited sovereign
immunity, and would need to waive it to be liable to private parties.'*)
C. Mandatory Modifications: Protection from Shifts and Private Appeals

The existing regulation governing compensation for landowners is inefficient and fails to
manage the burdens appropriately. Two problematic elements of the curknt regulation require
change. The first is the lack of protection granted to private landowners from sudden elk herd
shifts from other private land. The second is the lack pf protection granted to landowners from
the consequences of being unable to market permits. The following section discusses these two
requirements.
1. Protecting Landowners From Shifts
P

Shifts of elk herds between private lands are the result of a failure to manage the
incentives to keep elk on private land. The regulation fails because it does not account for higher
financial returns available to landowners without resident elk. Within any regulatory framework
which relies on having elk resident on private lands, when there is the opportunity for a

See N.M.S.A. 9: 9-7-5 1, which limits the improvements made on leased lands. Estimates
of the cost for a mile of elk-proof fencing ranged to $3000 per mile. By limiting state-land
lessees to $150 fence improvements, the state guarantees that mixed-ownerslup land cannot
exclude elk.
Ia2

The New Mexico courts impose a "primary effect test." City of Albuatue v. Reddimg,
605 P.2d 1156 (1980). This test resulted in waiver of immunity in Firemen's Fund hsum&&a
v. Tucker, 618 P.2d 894 (allowing suits against the N.M. Highway Department). Thus, the
question would be the primary effect of the current statute or regulation, which does not
explicitly allow for liability. The courts will construe waiver of sovereign immunity where the
purpose is protection of the public, because "[tlhe direction indicated . . in interpreting the Tort
Claims Act has been toward a liberal, rather than a narrow, construction of the Act." Firemen's
Fund I n s ~ c Co.
e v. -,
618 P.2d 894, at 896. Consequently, the question is whether 19
N.M.A.C. 30.5 works to protect the public, and the answer is that it does not. Without this
purpose, construed waiver of sovereign immunity is unlikely, and the landowner cannot maintain
a suit for damages against the state.
'83
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landowner to derive more income without resident elk, the regulatory system will fail to achieve
its goals because the landowner will always have a limited incentive to shift the elk from the
land. Achievement of the general regulatory policies will be hampered by those incentives
because of the consequences to the elk which could include death or reduced reproduction. Thus,
it must be illegal to harass elk in any way.Iw Other states have adopted strict prohibitions on
harassment. These prohibitions are inadequate on their own. It is imperative that the other
motives for shifts in wildlife also be taken into account within the regulatory system in order to
appropriately manage their consequences.

-

First, protection must be given to the small landowners. Any landowner who in good
faith files a valid and proven depredation claim must be guaranteed either a permit or recovery
from the state. This ensures that even the smallest landowners have incentive to report elk
depredations. Further, it guarantees that the marginal ranches are not b q d from recovering
their losses and maintains the landowners' opportunity to realize their economic expectation^.'^^

I"
One solution to excessive non-fatal harassment of wildlife is to criminalize the attempted
act. See WYO.STAT.5 23-1-102 (1977) which defines taking game as to "hunt, pursue, catch,
capture, seine, fish, trap, kill, or possess, or attempt to hunt, pursue, catch, capture, seine, fish,
trap, kill, or possess." This does not describe the full range of methods available to a landowner.
See COLO.REV.STAT.5 33-1-102 (1990), defining harassment of game as "to unlawhlly
endanger, wony, impede, annoy, pursue, disturb, molest, rally, concentrate, hany, chase, herd, or
torment wildlife." New Mexico does not describe harassment in any great depth. See supra,
note *** (unsure of the number). General regulatory powers governing harassment are granted in
N.M.S.A. 5 17-2-2, which states "[tlhe game animals ...herein defined shall be protected and
hunting, taking, capturing, killing, or attempt to hunt, take, capture or kill of any or all species
named herein shall be regulated by the state game commission." Consistent with that provision,
New Mexico grants endangered and threatened species like protection, stating that "'take' or
'taking' means to harass, hunt, capture or kill any wildlife or attempt to do so." With either the
broad or narrow definitions, the statutes err because they focus on the act of harassment and not
the indicia of harassment. In doing so they protect only one part of the act, and in doing so,
protect only one victim of the act. The recipient landowners must have some role in determining
when an act of harassment occurs.

Is5 This article suggests that a landowner formulates economic expectations annually.
Sudden changes in elk populations interfere with these expectations. Further, the amount of
herd shift interference with these expectations is proportional with the size of the ranch. This is
another form of the marginal ranch problem: a single elk displacing a single cow matters much to
a ranch which can only support one cow. The supporting land might be inadequate to merit a
permit under the current regulations. As noted above, the only remaining methods for
remediating the problem are illegal: no regulatory system should put such small landowners in a
position to be tempted to violate the laws of the State.

-7
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Second, the state must maintain seasonal and perhaps daily elk measurement. Elk are
prone to shifts during days and seasons.lg6 They do not generally stay in the same area over long
periods,Is7and they panic in groups.lS8 During a given year, elk travel in herds of varying
sizes.'" This could affect a landowner's burden over the course of a year. Thus, a landowner's
burden cannot be measured at a single time of day in a single season. More in-depth
of elk as
measurement of elk habits and pooulations is required to provide for a stable pooulation
..
it grows and hunting controls its population. Further, consistent and regular measurements
would reduce the current incentive to chase off elk after initial verification and subsequent hunts.
&

Elk-proof fencing poses the largest risk to elk populations after hunters.lgOWithin its
broad responsibility for managing the elk species, the DGF should have limited oversight over
fence installation plans to ensure that there is no substantial disruption of species behaviors
caused by unilateral action. The landowner should apply for a permit to erect the fence,Ig1and
the permit should include a certification by the landowner that the land suffered no elk
depredations for over a year. With this certification, the landowner assumes the cost of fencing,

Ig6

Boyd, supra note 45, at 18.

'"

Id. This is especially important for cases of harassment, because elk that panic in groups
also trample fences. The closer the elk measurements approximate the various sizes of these
groups the better the compensation will match the injury suffered. Panicking of elk is a serious
factor when considering the smallest landowner's burden: evenif the elk do not remain for a
season or longer, trampling alone could do proportionally more damage to a small landowner's
ranch.
Ix9

Id., at 18-20.

See Boyd, supra note 45, at 18, where he states that "Rocky Mountain Elk incur relatively
large prenatal and postnatal losses. This apparently is due in large measure to restrictive forage
conditions on winter ranges and, to a lesser degree on disease and predation."
I9O

19' This provision should not govern non-elk-proof fences. Raising permeable fences poses
no significant risk to elk and olacement of these fences is a ranch-management decision of which
should play no part.*Nor should this provision govern e ~ k - ~ r ofences
of
that are outside
the
the geographical limits of the DGF comprehensive elk habitat and fencing plans. The DGF's
authority extends only to the elk and their likely and desired locations, and no further. A
landowner wishing to raise elk-proof fencing outside the limits of the plan should not fall within
DGF regulations solely because the fencing in question might impact elk habitat at some future
time.

DGF

-,

and the claim of no depredations is presumed to be valid.192

-

The DGF should develop a comprehensive plan for the ideal levels and locations of elk in
New Mexico. That plan should describe the location of the desired potential elk-proof fences. If
the DGF adopts the privately-proposed fence as part of its long term plans for shifting the
migratory patterns of elk within the state, the parties should share the cost of the fencing. The
DGF and the landowner should divide the difference between the cost of the elk-proof fence and
the cost of the elk-permeable fence19' that the landowner could raise instead. The landowner
should be immune from challenge of this plan, because the plan is DGF-based and sponsored.
The DGF retains the option to not fence the property with elk-proof fencing. Because the result
of this choice would be continued elk depredations, the option not to fence should result in
annual compensation to the landowner194for the opportunity cost of not fully using the land for
cattle while the depredations ~0ntinue.l~~
If the DGF opted to pay for fencing, the landowner should be under an a£tiiative duty to
care for the fence. Failure to do so would bar depredations recovery by the landowner. Further,
failure to raise the fence within a reasonable period would be deemed a waiver of liability for
future depredations by elk. The DGF should provide written notice to the landowner of its intent
to provide fencing costs. An adequate time period must be given to allow the landowner to make
any necessary financial adjustments.
This presumption should be rebuttable. Either interested private parties or DGF should be
permitted to challenge the presumption when the permit is issued. The compliance with DGF
species plans for that GMU would make the fence permissible.
19'

This notion rests on the dual-user principle. The idea is that both users derive benefit from
the fence, and it is inappropriate to shift the costs of fencing wholly to the private party.
Colorado statutory provisions provide that the Colorado Division of Wildlife should furnish
"sufficient and appropriate damage prevention materials" to landowners, or in the alternative,
expose itself to liability for damages caused by wildlife. COLO.REV. STAT.3 33-3-103 (1990).
The statute conditions the landowner's right to recovery for such damages in a number of ways.
COLO. REV. STAT.§ 33-3-103. That same provision requires the landowner to use and maintain
the materials provided and to limit access fees charged to hunters for access to private lands.
COLO.REV. STAT.4 33-3-103 (d) - (g). Quite clearly, the statute allocates the burdens of
preventing depredations between the parties.
19'

IW The compensation should be for single-season displacement damage, and no more. The
DGF should not be required to insure the landowner against future losses or damage to the cattle.
In other instances, this is the replacement cost of the cattle.

This rests on the principle that the elk displace cattle directly. The landowner would be
required to file a depredation claim, describing the depredations, the location, and causes of
depredation requiring compensation.

?

Under current regulations, the landowner maynot contract with DGF to leave a portion of
deeded lands for elk in exchange for exclusion of elk on other portions of the lands.'96 This type
of ecological and economic compromise encourages development of a wildlife industry while
limiting the direct invasion damages to the landowner. In effect, the landowner agrees to allow
the DGF an easement to use part of the private lands for public purposes with the understanding
that the remaining wholly private lands will not be invaded by resident wildlife. Where the
landowner grants this form of easement, the DGF should pay for the elk-proof fencing. The
lands used in this type of scheme should be selected in accordance with the DGF comprehensive
plans for the species.

r-

The DGF should provide the landowner the option to either accept direct monetary
compensation or take permits in exchange for elk depredations. These permits function as access
permits and licenses for possession of wildlife.19' The access granted by permits should be
ranch-only, but the permits should be transfertable within GMUs for use-on other ranches.
Landowners should have the full right to exclude hunters from their property and the freedom to
limit damage by hunters to their lands. When the landowner accepts the permits, they become
private property, and the landowner assumes liability for recovering adequate compensation. If
the landowner opts not to participate in the market for elk permits, the landowner recovers only
the cost of elk displacement: the access fees arranged between hunter and landowner are not
limited.
B. Modifications of the Appeals Process

P
,

The appeals process requires substantial modification. Changes should include limiting
the use of discretion, expanding the issues raisable on appeal, including inter-season hunts, and
ensuring quick appeals. The need for regularity in the system is key because a more rigid system
is a system which produces consistent results. This rigidity does not foreclose discretion on the
part of local officers, but merely ensures that the use of discretion is consistent with the state
policy objectives.

,

As discussed above, broad discretion on the part of local DGF officers inhibits
achievement of the state policy governing elk. By allowing broad discretion, the current
regulatory system escapes accountability for its effects on landowners. The system provides
variable results and inconsistent compensation to landowners. Discretion in the permit allocation
process must be limited by specific conditions and clear factors in the determination of who

More accurately, the landowner must provide cbpies of deeds to the DGF showing title to
all lands. It is unclear that a landowner can exempt a portion of lands from the consideration of
total private deeded acres on the principle that the land cannot cany elk because of exclusionary
fencing. See 19N.M.A.C. 30.5 5 8.4-8.5.
'%

19'

Gonzales, supra note 2, at 180;see generally COLO. REV. STAT.

9 33-3-103(1990).

receives additional permits, and at what time. Adding systemic rigidity would allow the DGF to
review GMLJs for their compliance with the general goals.

Q

On the other hand, some elements of the current regulation are too rigid. When revising
the regulations, landowners should not be limited to a single hunting season for their permitbased compensation. Hunts serve a number of purposes,'98not the least of which is reducing the
elk burden on a landowner's property. This reduction is the purpose behind the special
depredation hunts currently allowed on state lands.'* This goal is valid on state lands as well as
on private lands. Since the sale of permits is key to compensation of land0wners,2~special
hunting seasons on private lands should be allowed in instances where the hunt was unsuccessful
within the GMU and the landowners received little compensation.201Landowners should be
allowed to petition DGF for a special hunt, and the denial of a hunt should be appealable through
the ordinary appeals process.
The speed of the appeals process is key to providing useful compensation to the
landowner. Currently, the only deadlines the DGF uses are those it imposes on itselPoZand on
the landowner filing the appeal."' Functionally, correction of error in allocation of permits is

198 See generally Gonzales, at 179-181; Wade, Dale A., Economics of Wildlife Production
and Damage Control on Private Lands, in Valuing Wildlife (Decker, Daniel J . & Goff, Gary, R
eds.) 154, at 158.
I*

See 19N.M.A.C. 31.8 5 8.2.

2W

Gonzales, supra note 2, at 180.

In addition, the hunting season could be extended during the fall. This sort of discretion,
for a single purpose, with clearly defined conditions would be desirable to achieve the state
policy objectives. The two regulations, 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 and 19 N.M.A.C. 31.8 do not work
together. The first remains consistent with its goal, while the second undermines the DGF's
incentive to encourage the first because the safety-valve depredation hunt will always be
available. Gonzales quotes Aldo Leopold as instructing: "Recognize the landowner as the
custodian of the public game on all private land, protect him from the irresponsible shooter, and
compensate him for putting his land in productive condition." 19 N.M.A.C. 3 1.8 is inconsistent
with the first and last of those three directives. The first because no incentive exists for the
landowner to care for the wildlife if no benefit will accrue, the last because it prohibits
compensation for the landowner. 19 N.M.A.C. 31.8 $ 8.2.
20'

202

See Landowner Agreement, supra note 18, at 2.

203

See 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 3 9.

.
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limited by the hunting season, since they are issued annuallyzo4for a specific hunt. Further,
errors in allocation cannot be corrected because permits are deemed an annual compensation to
~ ~additional compensatory seasons are unavailable. Existing deadlines do
the l a n d o ~ n e r s , 2and
not ensure a speedy answer from DGF because they only serve to limit the use of permits by
citizens. Other states instituted administrative deadlines which produce presumptive results
by
favoring the landowner.206While the landowner must still provide proof of the clain1,2~~
providing independent administrative deadlines, the arrangement removes the burden fiom the
landowner.2o8The burden of initiating a challenge must be borne by the landowner, and the
burden of producing a speedy response by the DGF.

See 19 N.M.A.C. 30.5 § 8.1.
Moreover, permits are deemed a single compensation for the aggregate damages of the
resident elk. See Gonzales, supra note 2, at 181, where he generalizes that "landowners see
authorizations as a compensatory vehicle for the recovery of losses. ... Authorizations provide a
vehicle for recovering those expenses caused by wildlife." Since the authorizations are available
only once a year, and the depredations are not for prospective damages, the only interpretation
remaining is that they serve to compensate for the annualized aggregate damages.
206

See COLO.REV.STAT.9 33-3-103 (2)(e); WYO.STAT.5 23-1-901 (c).

lo7See

-

COLO.REV.STAT.§ 33-3-104 (3); WYO.STAT.§ 23-1-901 (a).

208 A finding of no impact is distinguishable from no response. Where a level of appeals
finds the information orovided would leave the formula allocation unchanged.
- that level of
appeal is terminated without prejudice against the DGF.

IV. Conclusion
The current regulatory system of allocating elk permits to landowners is inefficient. It
creates disincentives to positive management and contradicts the doctrine the State Game
Commission relied on in creating the regulation. It provides transfers of money to ranches, with
a decided preference for transfers to larger ranches, which marginalizes small ranches and
consequently excludes them from the compensatory process which 19N.M.A.C. 30.5 creates.
Consideration of other states' practices suggests a broad range of possible administrative
schemes, some of which are particularly appropriate for New Mexico. The proposed statute in
Appendix A works to correct the flaws in the current regulatory structure. Consequently, the
author strongly advocates adoption of the proposed statutory scheme.

Table 1
Acreage Distributions for G.M.U. Residents Allocated Permits

Table 2
Selected G.M.U. Acreage and Permit Type Distributions

0.

Note that this quantity is significantly inflated by a single ranch which anomalously took
400 cow and 200 bull permits, the reverse of the pattern for the remainder of the unit.
2W

Appendix A
Proposed Statute
I.
11.

111.

IV.

Title. This act shall be known as the "Landowner Elk Damage Compensation Act."
Purpose. It is the purpose of this act to do the following:
A.
To provide a mechanism, consistent with the biological needs of wildlife, to
compensate private landowners for damage done to their property, real, personal,
or otherwise, by elk managed by the State of New Mexico;
B.
To ensure that landowners of properties of all sizes are compensated evenly for
damage caused by elk, and to ensure that every ranch receives meaningful
compensation for that damage;
C.
To ensure that the management of wildlife responds to public interest by
involving the public in setting its wildlife goals; and
D. To,ensure that landowners have efficient, speedy, and effective recourse to obtain
answer for their complaints regarding licensing and permitting decisions,
applicable to the landowner, through an internal administrative appeals process.
Not within Purposes. It is not within the purposes of this act to provides private cause
of action against the State of New Mexico for damage caused by elk or within the
purposes to create a private cause of action to recover for damage caused by elk owned by
private parties.
Definitions. As used throughout the act, the following terms are defined for
convenience.
A.
"Harassment." Harassment of wildlife by private parties is any intentional act
tending to annoy, bother, disturb, arouse, frighten, scare, panic. rally, intimidate,
or terrify wildlife managed by the State of New Mexico. Harassment is non-fatal
to the wildlife.
B.
"Taking." Taking of wildlife by private parties is any intentional act which does,
or significantly contributes to the proximate demise of wildlife managed by the
State of New Mexico. Taking may occur indirectly pursuant to negligent acts
having harmful consequences for the animals. Taking is fatal to the wildlife.
C.
"Plan." The Plan is the regulatory plan promulgated by the New Mexico
Department of Game and Fish and the State Game Commission consistent with
the provisions contained herein.
D. "Depredations." Depredations by wildlife are damage to private property caused
by wildlife managed by the State of New Mexico. Depredations, herein, are used
to mean physical destruction of private property, as well as indirect damages
which limit the productivity of private land. Both types of injury may be
compensated through use of the Plan.
E.
"Inspections." To verify that damages occur, the State of New Mexico must make
physical inspections of private property to estimate damage. Where helpful and

--- ,

V.
c

possible, verification should be made in the company of the private landowner.
Verification of destructive damage, such as downed fencing or damaged structures
may be conducted through recordings, photographic or otherwise, which clearly
demonstrate significant and unique physical features which identify the property
in question as belonging to the landowner.
"Permit." A qualifying landowner will be allocated elk license permits which
F.
allow the landowner to purchase elk licenses at a modest fee. These permits are
transferrable amongst private individuals and are not controlled by licensepossession requirements which limit a possessor to a limited quantity of licenses
per calendar year.
G.
"Department." The Department is the New Mexico Department of Game and Fish
and any subsidiary administrative agencies obliged to manage the wildlife of New
Mexico.
H.
"Gender Ratio." For each Game Management Unit in which the Department
allocates elk permits, the Department shall determine a Gender Ratio which
governs the ratio bekeen thk genders (Bull and Cow) that the total elk population
is reduced within the Game Management
Unit. The determination of this ratio
shall rely on all relevant statistics, such as degree of depredations suffered,
population goals, ratio of public to private land, hunting successes of the two
genders, and any other statistics that the Department finds relevant.
Authorization for Promulgating Regulations. The appropriate New Mexico regulatory
agencies are hereby given authority to promulgate regulations consistent with these
provisions. The provisions contained herein are to be viewed as guidance in the
promulgation of those regulations.
A.
Inspections and Duties. The Department and landowner should comply with the
following provisions as they apply to the Department or landowner.
1.
Duty to Measure Wildlife Populations. It is the duty of the Department
to measure the elk population within the State of New Mexico on an
annual basis. Reference to prior year hunting success and landowner
participation are relevant concerns, but are inadequate to measure the elk
population. The Department may not rely on previous depredations claims
by landowners as a presumptively accurate measurement of elk
depredations.
Duty to Inspect Landowner Claims. It is the duty of the Department to
2.
inspect and verify all depredation claims by landowners.
3.
Duty to Report Changes in Population. Where a landowner applies files
a depredation claim, and the Department verifies the claim, the landowner
is under a duty to report significant changes in that population, especially
large increases in population. The Department shall inspect and verify
these claims, and account for them when allocating permits.
4.
Duty to Obtain Permission. Whenever the Department wishes to
conduct inspections, the Department must:
a.
Provide 48 hours notice, oral or otherwise, of the planned

inspection time;
Request permission from the landowner to enter the private
property upon arrival at the private property;
c.
Choose an alternative time recommended by the landowner if the
time requested is either inconvenient or likely to produce underrepresentation of the actual elk population on the private land; and
d.
Allow the landowner to escort the Department's representative(s)
to the site(s) where depredations occur.
5.
Duty to Cooperate. The landowner is under a duty to cooperate, when
ever reasonably possible, with the Department in the inspections. If the
landowner fails to allow access, or prevents inspection by the Department,
the landowner will not be eligible for landowner permits for the year in
which resistance occurs.
Allocation of Permits to ando owners Suffering Depredations. -The allocation of
pennits to landowners suffering quantified depredations shall be conditioned on the
following provisions.
A.
Minimum Bull Permits. When allocating permits to landowners, the first permit
issued to any landowner shall be a Bull permit.
B.
Equality in Distribution of Further Permits. The allocation of all further
permits to the depredated landowners within a Game Management Unit shall be
governed by the gender ratio. Consequently, the ratio shall be applied equally
across all ranches within that Game Management Unit, as related by the
characteristics the Department finds relevant.
C.
Discretionary Permits Distribution. Any discretionary permits issued by the
Department shall be issued consistent within the following guidelines:
1.
Public Information. The number, gender, and recipient ranches of
discretionary permits shall be made public information;
2.
Equal Ratios. The allocation of discretionary permits shall be distributed
consistent with the gender ratio for the Game Manaeement Unit:
3.
Documented Justification. The agent allocating discretionary permits
shall arovide a documented iustification for allocatine.
- the permit, which
shall be filed and access allowed to it upon request of the public. Mere
landowner displeasure with an allocation is insufficient a s a justification.
4.
Consistent With the Needs of the Wildlife. No discretionary permit
shall be allocated which causes significant changes in the resident elk
'
population. Eradication of elk presence within a region is not a
justification for discretionary permits.
Seasons and Depredation Hunts. The Department may extend hunting seasons for
specific Game Management Units for several reasons. Similarly, depredation hunts may
be held for those reasons, and for others enumerated herein. These two extensions or
modifications of existing seasons are conditioned in a number of ways.
A.
Extended Hunting Seasons for Game Management Units. The Department
may extend hunting seasons for specific Game Management Units based on the
b.

VI.

-

VII.

-

VIII.
n

following policies:
Purpose is to Compensate Landowners. Where landowners meet with
1.
little success in using elk licenses, the Department may extend the season.
That extension is only to allow the landowners who failed to harvest elk to
do so. No additional permits for this season may be allocated.
2.
To Bring Game Management Unit into Compliance with Plan. Where
the Department has developed the Plan, and established population goals,
fencing plans, and land-use plans, the Department may extend hunting
seasons to bring specific Game Management Units into compliance with
the Plan. In such cases, a majority of landowners suffering depredations
within the Game Management Unit need not approve the extension.
3.
Majority Required. For such a season extension to compensate
landowners, a majority of landowners within the Game Management Unit
who suffer elk depredations must consent to the extension. If a majority is
not in favor of the extension, it cannot be made.
4.
Only an Extension of Hunting Season. Such extensions cannot be
construed to allow the Department to hold additional hunting seasons. An
extension must be held immediately following the regular hunting season.
5.
Profit to the Landowner. When the Department extends the hunting
season for a Game Management Unit, any profit or access fee the
landowner wishes to charge for access or transfer of the permit remains
with the landowner and does not revert to the State of New Mexico.
B.
Depredation Hunts. Individual landowner property may be granted authority to
hold depredation hunts where certain conditions are met.
1.
Population Changes. Where the resident elk population on a specific
property changes substantially, the Department and landowner may agree
to hold depredation hunts, rather than waiting until permits are allocated.
Lack of Majority. Where the Game Management Unit landowners refuse
2.
to extend a hunting season, the Department may authorize depredation
hunts on individual properties within those Game Management Units.
Specific Management Goals. Where the Department and private
3.
landowners consent to designate land as elk-free, pursuant to other
agreements, or to raise elk-impermeable fences consistent with the Plan,
the Department may conduct elk depredation hunts to eliminate resident
elk populations.
4.
No Profit to the Landowner. A landowner using a depredation hunt may
not charge fees for access, use, or traverse of land pursuant to the
depredation hunt. A landowner may not charge for the permits used in a
depredation hunt. A landowner may opt to use all permits for a
depredation hunt personally. The carcasses from a depredation hunt
remain the property of the State of New Mexico.
Appeals Process. The landowner, and the public generally, may appeal certain
administrative decisions rendered by the Department, subject to specific controls

described herein. The landowner, the public, and the Department operate under certain
obligations during this appeals process. The Department shall create an appeals process
consistent with these provisions.
A.
Grounds for Appeal. The following shall be included as grounds for appeal of a
Department decision.
1.
No Permits Allocated by Formula. If a landowner applies for, and the
Department denies, elk permits for the season, the landowner may appeal
this decision. The Department shall consider evidence of permits
allocated to other ranches, similarly situated within the Game
Management Unit, in its decision. Where the Department grants
discretionary permits to other ranches within the Game Management Unit,
it shall be prima faciaevidence that a landowner suffering
- depredations
should receive a permit. The Department may rebut this presumption.
2.
Mathematical Error. Where the Department commits a mistake in its
calculation and allocation of permits,the landowner may present this error
and if borne out on review, the Department shall correct the mistake.
Similarly, the landowner may appeal any allocation based on an incorrect
factual premise used by the Department when it allocates permits within
the Game Management Unit.
3.
Gender Ratio Inconsistenw. Where the landowner receives an
allocation of permits, and the gender of those permits is significantly
different from the Gender Ratio established by the Department for the
Game Management Unit, the landowner may appeal this. Similarly, the
landowner may raise an appeal where other landowners within the Game
Management Unit receive permits inconsistent with the Gender Ratio
determined by the Department.
4.
Failure to Grant Discretionary Permits. Where the landowner applies
for, and the Department denies, a claim for discretionary permits, the
landowner may appeal this decision. This appeal shall only be valid if
there were other discretionary permits granted within the Game
Management Unit.
5.
Appeal of Plan. At its annual review of the contents of the Plan, the
Department shall allow interested parties to request a reconsideration of
the Plan. A request for reconsideration must be based on one or more of
the following criteria:
a.
Significant public interest in increasing, or decreasing, the amount
of elk managed by the state. A request for reconsideration may be
accompanied by petitions or other collected statements of
community desires; and
b.
Erroneous understanding of the elk, their population, or the impact
on private lands. Any erroneous fact which the Department relies
upon in designing, or modifying, the Plan may be presented in a
request for reconsideration. Parties may also demonstrate that the

-
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B.

desired elk population may be managed in a way which impacts
private land less.
Appeal of Compensation for Shared Fencing Costs. Where the
6.
Department opts not to rely on landowner-provided information about the
cost of shared elk-proof fencing, the landowner may request arbitration of
the matter. In such case, the Department shall nominate one arbitrator, the
landowner shall nominate one arbitrator, and the two arbitrators shall
nominate a third. These three arbitrators shall hear the matter and provide
a binding answer within sixty (60) working days.
Obligations of the Department and Individuals. The obligations of the
individuals and the Department, during the appeals process, are the following.
1.
Individual Obligations.
a.
Timeliness. If the landowner wishes to raise an appeal based on
any of the grounds described above, it must be made in a timely
fashion.
Initial Permit Allocation Offer. The landowner may raise
(1)
an appeal up to twenty (20) days from the postmark on the
initial permit allocation offer made by the Department.
Internal
Appeals. The landowner must raise an appeal of
(2)
an internal appeals decision within five (5) days of the
receipt of the previous internal appeals decision.
Appeal During Public Meetings. A landowner wishing to
(3)
appeal to be heard during a public meeting shall have
fifteen (15) days from the last internal appeal stage to file
the claim.
Good Faith. The landowner appealing an administrative decision
b.
shall operate on a good faith belief in the validity of the claim.
Failure to do so shall be grounds for barring the landowner from
receipt of permits for the next hunting season.
2.
Department Obligations.
a.
Timeliness. The Department shall review any appeal in a timely
fashion. These appeals shall be reviewed in accordance with the
following guidelines.
Administrative Record Appeals. During any stage of
(1)
internal review, which the public may not attend, the
Department shall provide an answer within five (5)
working days, or before the beginning of the next hunting
season, which ever is earlier.
Public Meeting Appeals. During any stage of public
(2)
review, which the public may attend, the Department shall
provide an answer within thirty (30) days, or before the
beginning of the next hunting season, which ever is earlier.
Documentation. For each stage of review, the Department shall
b.

IX.

provide written opinions justifying its affirmance or change of
previous administrative decisions. This written record may serve
as the basis for a landowner's appeal, and is subject to appeal
independent of the substantive merits of the landowner's claim.
Public Meetings. For every stage of review held during
(1)
meetings which the public may attend, the Department shall
conduct the meeting as if it were quasi-judicial in nature.
For any review held during public meetings, the
Department need not supply written opinions to the
landowner as a predicate to deciding the merit of the
landowner's complaint, but shall provide one if requested to
do so.
c.
Presumption of Validity. The landowner's appeal claim shall be
presumed to be valid, if presented to the Department in accordance
with these guidelines. This presumption shall only affect claims
which meet the Department's requirements for document
production, and which are filed in a timely fashion. This
presumption shall only affect claims which the Department fails to
act on in a timely fashion. Where one stage of review fails to
complete its review in a timely fashion, it shall be the duty of the
officer(s) of the next stage of review to make the calculations and
allocate permits accordingly, without regard to the truth of the
landowner's claim.
The Coordinated Elk-Fencing Plan. The Department shall create a Coordinated ElkFencing Plan which describes the state-wide goals for the populations and locations of
Elk within the State of New Mexico. The Plan shall meet the following criteria.
A.
State-Wide and Local Target Populations. The Plan shall describe the overall
State-wide elk population goals and the population goals for each Game
Management Unit in which elk are to exist. These population targets shall set
long-range population targets, in addition to annual intermediary population
tarpets.
B.
Impact on Other Managed Species. For all other species of game which the
Department manages, the Plan shall consider the impact of elk populations on
their populations, their habitat, and locations within the State of New Mexico.
C.
Migratory Patterns. The Plan shall clearly describe the migratory patterns of the
elk managed by the State of New Mexico. Care shall be taken to avoid interfering
with these patterns, except where desirable, for other reasons, such as an interest
in eliminating minor and insufficient elk populations from certain regions of the
State of New Mexico.
D.
Preference for Management of Elk on State Land. Wherever practicable, the
Department and the Plan shall manage the elk of New Mexico on public, rather
than private, lands. This shall only be construed as a preference between
locations otherwise equal in benefit to the State of New Mexico.

E.

X.

Minimized Impact on Private Landowners. When considering the impacts of
elk populations, the Plan shall choose the locations for elk which minimize the
burden on private landowners caused by elk. This minimization standard shall
only be used when there are two options, otherwise equal, for managing the elk.
F.
Respect Private Land-Management Decisions. The Plan shall not assume that
all private land-uses are equal. Where lands are expressly used for elk or wildlife,
either to raise, harvest, or protect, the Plan shall include this in its calculations.
Where the lands cannot be accessed by elk, the Plan shall consider this as well.
Allow Elk-Proof Fencing. The Department shall allow elk-proof fencing where
G.
such fencing is an element of, or not in contradiction of, the long range population
goals for elk populations or their migratory patterns.
Cost-Sharing of Elk-Proof Fencing. Where the private landowner desires to raise elkproof fencing to protect private land from elk depredations, the Department shall have
limited authority to supervise this plan. This authority shall be consistent with these
provisions. Further, the actual compensation due a landowner for such fencing shall be
governed by these requirements.
A.
If Fence is Not Within the Plan. The Department shall have no authority to
manage fences which are not within the Plan's long-range population goals for
region and size. Where a fence exists, the Department may not require its
removal.
1.
Elk-Permeable Fences. Even within the short-range goals of the Plan,
the Department may not exercise any authority over the use of elkpermeable fences.
B.
If Fence is Consistent with the Plan. If the proposed elk-proof fence is
consistent with the Plan's long-range population goals, the Department may use it
as part of the Plan. Where the landowner desires to raise an elk-proof fence, the
following provisions shall govern:
Permitting. The Department shall give, or deny, the landowner the
1.
authority to raise an elk-proof fence. This permission shall only be
granted when the landowner provides a written (including a map
describing the property and proposed fencing) description of the property
and the fencing plan.
2.
Fencing Allowed. Where the Department opts to allow the elk-proof
fencing, the Department shall share the costs of the fencing with the
private landowner.
a.
Fence Along the Plan's Border. Where the proposed fence runs
along with border of the Plan, the Department shall always allow
the landowner to raise the fence.
(1)
Plan Amendments. At its annual review of the Plan, the
Department shall amend the Plan to explicitly allow for
such fences to exist.
b.
Department Discretion in Accepting Landowner Claims.
Where the Department allows the elk-proof fencing, the

XI.

Department may compensate the landowner directly for half of the
following costs:
Cost of Labor. The difference between the cost of raising
(1)
elk-permeable fences and the cost of raising elk-proof
fences shall be compensable;
Cost of Fencing Materials. The difference between the
(2)
cost of fencing materials for elk-permeable fences and the
cost of fencing materials for the elk-proof fencing shall be
compensable.
c.
Department Refusal of Claim. The Department may refuse to
compensate the landowner for the claimed costs for reasons
including:
Failure to Minimize Costs. If the landowner fails to
(1)
minimize the expenses associated with raising the elk-proof
fences, the Department shall not be forced to compensate
the landowner;
Outside of the Plan. If the fencing is outside the reach of
(2)
the Plan, the landowner may not be compensated for the
costs of the fencing.
Department May Supply Labor or Materials. Where the
d.
Department will deny a landowner claim for compensation for
raised fencing, the Department may opt to supply the landowner
with the fencing materials, or may opt to raise the elk-proof
fencing itself. In such a case, the Department shall not owe
compensation to the landowner.
3.
Fencing Permit Denied. Where the Department denies the landowner the
permit to raise elk-proof fencing. this shall be prima facie proof of elk
depredations on private land. The Department shall have the following
administrative options at its discretion:
Offer of Permits. The Department may offer the landowner
a.
sufficient permits to compensate the landowner for depredations
suffered;
b.
Direct Financial Compensation. The Department may make
direct financial compensation to the landowner;
Condemnation of Private Land. The Department may condemn
c.
the private land consistent with other provisions of the New
Mexico Statutes Annotated; and
d.
Option to Raise the Fence Itself. The Department may opt to
raise the fence itself, without reference to the landowner.
Severability. If any of the above provisions are found inconsistent with the Constitutions
of the United States or of New Mexico, the violative provisions shall be severable from
the remainder of the Act.
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